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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this scenario: You are a junior trademark lawyer at
your firm. You are proud of your work for the Client, protecting and
enforcing the Client's young brand name. The Client is a midsize
company, seeking to increase growth and working hard to compete
against others in the marketplace. Last year, you helped the Client
to conclude a lawsuit against an infringer who had adopted a mark
very similar to the Client's trademark. In the complaint, you
included both federal trademark infringement and unfair
competition claims. As usual, you requested injunctive relief,
damages, attorney's fees, and costs in the complaint. The litigation
was factually intensive, as you had to establish likelihood of
consumer confusion for both the trademark infringement and unfair
competition claims. In the end, you won for the Client. The Client
incurred half a million dollars in litigation costs.
You have just received a call from the Client. The IRS has
challenged the Client's claimed deduction of the $500,000 in
litigation costs as ordinary business expenses. The Commissioner
reasons that the two claims contained in the complaint for the
trademark litigation drafted by you are very distinct, warranting
different tax treatments. The Commissioner also wants to
arbitrarily apportion the costs: $250,000 for the infringement
claim and $250,000 for the unfair competition claim. The cost
associated with the unfair competition claim is allowed to be
immediately deducted, while the cost for the trademark
infringement claim must be capitalized.
You are confused. You don't know anything about taxation of
trademarks. You only know trademark law, the subject matter
that you fell in love with during law school. You and everyone who
practices trademark law know that trademark infringement and
unfair competition claims are virtually the same. Something
about the distinction in tax treatment of the two claims bothers
you. The Client now asks you to take care of this matter. You
have no idea what to do at this moment.
Consider the next scenario: Still feeling quite confused, you
decide to take a break by focusing on different matters for the
Client for the time being. You notice that the Client has typically
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expended a large sum every year in advertising expenditures in its
efforts to sell products in connection with the Client's trademark.
The Client engages in a wide range of branding activities, ranging
from placing ads in the local newspapers, maintaining a strong
presence online through social media outlets, purchasing keywords
from Google, and keeping the Client's website fresh with new
content. The Client generally seeks a tax deduction in full for the
costs associated with these usual branding activities, and the IRS
has not challenged such tax return position. Recently, the Client
has decided to rejuvenate its brand with a new advertisement
campaign to inject a new image of youthfulness, boundless energy,
and fun. You, however, believe that the existing brand is doing
just fine, as goods are selling well. Therefore, you don't quite see
the need for a new, extensive, and expensive advertisement
campaign. On the trademark front, you are pleased that this new
campaign will enhance the visibility of the trademark, cultivating
an identity for the brand and increasing the level of protection for
the trademark.
The Client calls you again, inquiring whether the costs
associated with the expensive advertisement campaign to
rejuvenate the trademark will also be deductible like other usual
brand advertisement expenditures. You politely remind the Client
that you know next to nothing about the tax treatment of branding
expenditures. The Client insists that you look into the matter
because, after all, you are the trademark maven and this matter
does relate to trademark. Again, you don't know where to look for
the answer.
Unfortunately, the answers for the two scenarios above are
contained in a web of tax statutes, regulations, cases, and
administrative rulings that emerged in the absence of a rational
legal framework, providing a host of incoherent tax distinctions for
branding investment. Welcome to branding taxation, a zone of
discomfort for both intellectual property and tax scholars and
practitioners.
Branding is important not only to businesses,' but also to the
economy.2 The intellectual property laws and tax laws should thus
I See generally Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83 (2010) (observing
modern usage of brands by corporations to build spiritual attachments); Deven R. Desai,
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further the legitimate goals of encouraging and protecting brand
investments while maintaining a sound tax base. Intellectual
property protections for branding depend on advertisement and
enforcement, both of which demand significant amounts of private
investment by firms. Although one would expect similar tax
treatments of both categories of investment, the categories are
actually treated as vastly different for federal income tax
purposes. Additionally, tax distinctions also exist within each
category. The result is that some branding investments are
expensed and others are not. No article has explored in depth
these tax distinctions for branding activities. This Article fills that
void by evaluating tax rules governing branding within a
normative tax policy framework and advancing several proposals
where tax distinctions lack theoretical justification.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II focuses on the branding
role in business. This Part investigates how companies assert
their presence through branding and utilizing a wide range of
tactics to attract attention, build loyalty, and enhance goodwill.
Companies also embrace major branding campaigns to rescue
brands from fiascos or to inject new life into stale brands.
In addition to branding expenditures, companies fiercely protect
their brands through applicable laws. Parts III and IV of this
Article turn to trademark law and copyright law, respectively, for
potential claims asserted by brand owners against infringers. The
Lanham Act, under the theories of trademark anti-dilution,
From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981 (2012) (acknowledging modern business
practices with brands and advancing a new brand theory for trademarks); Jeremy N. Sheff,
Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245 (2011) (discussing brand equity and suggesting a
new alternative model for brand equity with consumer protection).
2 Companies were projected to spend $180 billion on advertising expenditures in 2014.
Total Media Advertising Spending in the United States from 2011 to 2018, STATISTA, http://
www.statista.comlstatistics/272314/advertising-spending-in-the-us/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2015). The impact of branding expenditures support job creation in the United States. For
every $1 million of advertising money expenditures, eighty-one jobs are created. Press
Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, New Study Underscores Advertising's Role as a Critical
Driver of the U.S. Economy (Jan. 14, 2014), http:l/www.ana.net/contentshowid/29144. The
contribution of the advertising industry to the economy also occurs outside the United
States. See generally ALEXANDRA ALBERT & BENJAMIN REID, THE CONTRIBUTION OF TIlE
ADVERTISING INDUSTRY TO THE UK ECONOMY: A CREATIVE INDUSTRIES REPORT (2011),
http://www.theworkfoundation.com/DownloadPublication/Report/295-The%20contribution
%20otfb/20advertising% 20to%20the%20UK%Oeconomy%203 11011 .pdf.
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infringement, and unfair competition, protects brands that are
primarily words or logos, as well as the total image, look and feel,
and packaging of a product or service. 3 In branding activities,
companies often create brand content protected under copyright
law. In the enforcement of brands and brand content, companies
incur substantial litigation costs under trademark law and
copyright law.
Part V of this Article explores the evolution of the current tax
regime governing brand building and enforcement. Under the
present system, advertising costs to foster brand equity are
expensed (with the exception of the costs of tangible assets
associated with advertising). In contrast, litigation costs incurred
to protect that enhancement of value must be capitalized (with the
exception of legal costs in unfair competition claims).
Part VI of this Article critiques the current tax regime governing
branding and makes appropriate recommendations where current
rules lack theoretical justification. It offers sound policy arguments
in support of tax law's current treatment (expensing) of usual brand
advertising-the costs of ordinary product, institutional, or goodwill
advertising. Chiefly, expensing ordinary brand advertising
stimulates economic growth and furthers administrative efficiency.
Further, expensing creates an even playing field between
businesses that advertise their own brands and businesses that
choose, instead, to license from others the right to use well-known
trademarks in connection with products they manufacture and sell.
Part VI, however, also questions whether the current unfavorable
tax treatment of tangible assets associated with advertising
potentially distorts firms' brand strategies, thus violating the
principle of tax neutrality.
Part VI then makes the case that tax law should be changed to
require the capitalization of unusual brand advertising-the costs
of marketing campaigns, graphic designs, and package designs.
This Part critiques the historic development of rules governing
campaign expenditures, suggesting they resulted from a lack of
clarity over the proper standard to apply. This Part also suggests
that a more appropriate standard might be found in the rules
3 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
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governing the tax treatment of repairs and improvements to
tangible property. Specifically, it argues that advertising
campaign expenditures, which strengthen, restore, or elevate the
brand, can be analogized to improvement costs of tangible
property, which have long been considered nondeductible capital
expenditures.
Part VI concludes by identifying an appropriate tax framework
for brand enforcement expenditures. It criticizes the current tax
distinction between litigation costs incurred in connection with
trademark infringement claims (capitalized) and similar costs
incurred in connection with unfair competition claims (expensed),
arguing that such distinction merely elevates form over substance.
If substance is to prevail in tax jurisprudence, the litigation costs
associated with both actions should be capitalized, reflecting that
both are brought primarily to establish the taxpayer's trademark
and not to recover income. Likewise, consistent tax treatment
curbs arbitrary apportionment of costs.
II. THE BRANDING RoLE IN BUSINESS
Branding is everywhere. 4  Branding is one of the most
important aspects of any business.5 Branding allows a company to
4 See, e.g., Joseph C. Daniels, The Branding of America: The Rise of Geographic
Trademarks and the Need for a Strong Fair Use Defense, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1720-21
(2009) (noting the wide spread of branding by public and private entities throughout the
United States); Daniel J. Kevles, A Primer of A, B, Seeds: Advertising, Branding, and
Intellectual Property in an Emerging Industry, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 657, 657-65 (2013)
(discussing branding and tracing its history in the innovation of seeds and related industries);
Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 910-13 (2013) (studying the function of
brands and recommending the use of brands to signify privacy commitments); Omari Scott
Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance and the Market for Corporate
Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1133, 1143-51 (2008) (analyzing how Delaware becomes a
brand for corporate charters and noting that the "Delaware brand is more than mere
marketing or advertising; it is a mixture of tangible and intangible elements that firms
value"). See generally Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate
Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (exploring the effects of branding consumers
through a study of four corporate deal structures).
5 John Williams, The Basics of Branding, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/77408 (last visited May 24, 2016); see also Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying
Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1182-85 (2010) (explaining that corporate
branding is important to not only the customers, but also the employees, of a company);
Ohm, supra note 4, at 937 (noting that words and symbols are information devices used to
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communicate with its customers what they can expect from the
company's products or services as well as distinguish the
company's offerings from those of competitor. 6 Branding provides
the company opportunities to deliver its promises to customers,
build customers' emotional attachment to products, and cultivate
long-lasting customer affinity.7 Branding also allows a customer
to express her preference, individuality, and identity.8
Companies deploy their branding strategies in multiple,
creative ways.9 For example, Hyundai entices customers to buy
cars by providing them the Hyundai Assurance-if the customer
loses income the year following purchase, Hyundai will allow the
customer to return the car. 10  Southwest Airlines operates
revolutionarily differently from all other airlines by providing
FREE BAGS, FLY HERE Tm service as part of its image as the
"people's airline."11  Starbucks adopted the unprecedented
listening-to-action concept in My Starbucks Ideas to get 150,000
ideas from its customers, "leading to the implementation of 277
new innovations for Starbucks."'12 Burger King promoted the
efficiently "communicate to potential customers that the product or service has been backed
by a known source who guarantees a specific level of quality and accountability").
6 Williams, supra note 5 ("[Y]our brand is your promise to your customer. It tells them
what they can expect from your products and services, and it differentiates your offering
from your competitors.").
7 Id.
8 See Desai, supra note 1, at 989 ("[Clonsumers may simultaneously use brands as
expressions of individuality and identity as they take a brand and alter it to match what
they see as the meaning of the brand and how that meaning relates to their self-image or
message."); Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 803 (2012) ("TIThe
'quality' sought by consumers in the market for status goods is the quality of the message
the brand conveys: its ability to communicate social status to others.").
9 See Gus Lubin, 60 Daring Brand Strategies That Paid Off, Bus. INSIDER (May 14,
2012, 11:17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/brands-that-get-people-talking-2012-5?O
p=l (listing various creative techniques for branding, including "making new rules,
marketing a belief, creating belonging inability expression, creating culture, leveraging
tension, using scarcity and encouraging play").
10 Id.
I1 Id.
12 Press Release, Starbucks, Starbucks Celebrates Five-Year Anniversary of My Starbucks
Idea (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130328006372/en/Starbuck
s-Celebrates-Five-Year-Anniversary-Starbucks-Idea; see also Mike Schoultz, How Starbucks
Used My Starbucks Idea to Ace Crowdsourcing, DIGITAL SPARK MKTG., http://www.digitalspar
kmarketing.com/innovation/my-starbucks-idea/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (summarizing how
Starbucks crowdsources through My Starbucks Idea by "encourage[ing customers to submit
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brand strategy for its Whopper with the Whopper Sacrifice reward,
in which customers could earn a free Whopper each time they
sacrificed and "defriended" ten friends on Facebook in the
"Friendship is strong, but the Whopper is stronger" campaign.13
Ben & Jerry's "blend[ed] Wall Street finance with Main Street
values" when the company offered its stock directly to customers,
employees, and friends of "Vermont residents" during its initial
public offering. 14
With the arrival of online social media, companies have begun
to identify and adopt new branding approaches to reach more
customers.' 5 They embrace social media and sites like Twitter,
Linkedln, Google+, Facebook, YouTube, and Pinterest to increase
their visibility to customers, partners, and searchers.16 Companies
understand that online visibility enhances and nurtures real
relationships in both the virtual and real worlds. 17 In other words,
they follow the mantra preached by brand executives: "Social
media is a powerful tool for increasing visibility, building
relationships, and connecting with others who are not in your
geography. Build your social media strategy around your personal
brand with authenticity, focus and consistency."18
Examining various branding campaigns reveals that companies
continuously search for and adopt creative and provocative
methods to attract attention to their products or services.19
ideas for better products, improving the customer experience, and defining new community
involvement, among other categories").
13 Andrew LaVallee, Burger King Cancels Facebook Ad Campaign, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15,
2009, 4:47 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/01/15/burger-king-cancels-facebook-ad-cam
paignl.
14 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 1606.
15 See William Arruda, Three Elements of an Effective Social Media Strategy, FORBES
(Aug. 27, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williamarruda/2013/08/27/three-elem
ents-of-an-effective-social-media-strategy/ ("Social media can be your best opportunity for
enhancing relationships and expanding your brand.").
16 Id.
17 See id. ("If you're avoiding social media, you're invisible to those who seek what you
have to offer. Be visible and available in the virtual world so you can expand your success
in the real world! Connecting with your virtual brand community helps you build and
nurture real relationships - relationships that will increase your success and fulfillment.").
18 Id.
19 See Lubin, supra note 9 (explaining different creative branding methods used by
various companies).
2016] 407
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Companies know that without effective branding strategies, their
products or services will very soon become unnoticed and
forgotten. As a result, small and large companies spend vast
monetary sums in their branding efforts. For example, in 2014,
global advertising expenditures were expected to reach $523
billion. 20 In the United States, companies spent $167 billion in
advertising expenditures in 2013, and the figure is predicted to
reach $190 billion in 2016.21 Furthermore, the phenomenal
growth in online advertisements delivered through mobile devices
and desktop computers surpassed newspaper advertisements in
2012 and likely exceeded both magazine and newspaper
advertisements in 2015.22
With all the branding strategies culminating in staggering
advertising expenditures, companies compete for customer and
partner attention. Some companies aim higher, reaching for and
achieving the status of top national or global brands. Every year,
Interbrand publishes its list of top global brands, showing the
fluctuations among brands due to increases or decreases in their
estimated values. 23 The active movements among brands hint at
fierce competition in the marketplace. For example, in 2011,
Apple was eighth in the top brand list, Coca-Cola first, and Google
fourth. 24 In 2012, Coca-Cola maintained first, Apple leaped to
second, and Google remained fourth.25 In 2013, Apple became the
new leader, Google jumped to second, and Coca-Cola fell from first
place for the first time in thirteen years to third.26  More
profoundly, the movements among brands reflect "how we buy,
20 JONATHAN BARNARD, ZENITH OPTIMEDiA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ADVERTISING
EXPENDITURE FORECASTS SEPTEMBER 2014 (2014), http://www.ZenithOptiMedia.silmedia/up
loads/ customladspend forecastsseptember2014_executive summary2.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See e.g., Best Global Brands 2013, INTERBRAND, http://interbrand.com/wp-content/uplo
ads/2015/08/Interbrand-Best-Global-Brands-2013.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (listing
Apple, Google, and Coca-Cola as the top three brands of 2013).
24 Interbrand's Best Global Brands Report 2011, CAMPAIGN BRIEF, http://www.campaignbri
ef.com/FINAL%201nterbrand%2OBest%20Global%20Brands%202011.pdf (last visited Dec. 27,
2015).
25 See Stuart Elliott, Apple Passes Coca-Cola as Most Valuable Brand, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30business/media/apple-passes-coca-cola-as-mo
st-valuable-brand.html?r=0 (reporting brand movements between 2012 and 2013).
26 Id.
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how we communicate with each other, even whether we speak
with each other."27 In other words, companies rely on branding to
sell their products and services, and along the way, branding
influences and changes "the way we live our lives."28
Understanding the impact of brands in the marketplace,
companies zealously guard the accumulated goodwill embodied in
a brand. In addition to advertising expenditures, companies spend
considerable efforts to minimize attracting negative attention to
brands. 29  For example, when Netflix faced major negative
publicity when 800,000 subscribers dropped its service, Netflix
immediately fixed the problem by rebranding itself from "being a
home deliverer of discs to a producer of video content and streamer
of video content to the homes of global subscribers, including a
voice recognition system named 'max' that quizzes subscribers and
gives them movie suggestions."30  Addressing negative publicity
decisively with the new rebranding campaign, Netflix understood
that the customer is fundamental to the creation of goodwill in the
brand. In the fierce, competitive business world, goodwill is the
"brand equity" or value that companies highly prize and protect in
order to survive and strive.31
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Chris Book, 4 Keys to Turning Negative Commenters into Brand Advocates,
CONVINCE & CONVERT, http://www.convinceandconvert.com/social-crm/4-keys-to-turning-ne
gative-commenters-into-brand-advocates/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (providing advice on
how to respond to online critics); Caysey Welton, How to Respond If You Find Your Brand
on Consumer Reports' 'Naughty List' this Season, PR NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.
prnewsonline.com/water-cooler/2013/11/251what-to-do-if-find-your-brand-on-the-naughty-lis
t/ (describing remedial actions for brands in the face of bad PR).
30 Edward Lawler, Netflix We Got It Right!, FORBES (June 24, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/edwardlawler/2013/06/24/netflix-we-got-it-rightl.
31 See Gigi DeVault, How to Measure Brand Equity, ABOUT.COM, http://marketresearch.abo
ut.comlodmarket.research.advertising/htHow-To-Measure-Brand-Equity.htm (last visited
Dec. 28, 2015) ('The impact that a brand has on consumer purchases or perceptions about a
product is known as brand equity. The word equity indicates that an asset has been
generated. In brand equity, the asset is intangible and is measured in terms of the value
attributed by a consumer or potential consumer to the product or service. Brand equity
translates into consumer goodwill and propensity to prefer or buy a branded product or
service."); see also Brand equity, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.comldefiniti
on/brand-equity.html (last visited May 24, 2016) ("A brand's power derived from the goodwill
and name recognition that it has earned over time, which translates into higher sales volume
and higher profit margins against competing brands.").
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III. PROTECTING BRANDS THROUGH LITIGATION
In addition to fiercely promoting brands in the marketplace, 32
companies rely on the legal system to enforce their brands against
unauthorized use that may harm and reduce the value of their
brand. There are three different theories of protection that
provide possible causes of action to brand owners, depending on
the level of brand recognition and the types of harm inflicted by
unauthorized users. The three theories of protection are available
to brands that are words, phrases, logos, and symbols, as well as
trade dress or the total look and feel of a product or service.
A. TRADEMARK DILUTION
Famous brands and trademarks are omnipresent. They appear
in digital and print media. They perch on bright billboards,
moving vehicles, and glossy brochures. They are the embedded
metatags programmed to appear on top of a search engines'
results, 33 or the keywords for searches directed to sponsored
links.34 They run across banner ads on computer screens and the
digital screens in Times Square. They are the icons, images, and
arbiters of culture, taste, desire, and power. 35 Famous names like
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Samsung, Intel, BMW, Louis Vuitton,
32 Samsung is a good example of how a company has engaged in the highly competitive
tech industry to become a leading brand. See Eric Pfanner & Brian Chen, Samsung:
Uneasy in the Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013l12/15/technol
ogy/Samsung-uneasy-in-the-lead.html?_r--o (describing Samsung's plan to maintain its lead
amongst competitors).
33 See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2008)
(defining "metatags" as "a component of a web-page's programming that contains deceptive
information about the webpage which is typically not observed when the webpage is
displayed in a web browser" and noting that a competition had embedded the metatags of
another company in its website to attract more consumers).
34 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142
(9th Cir. 2011) (noting how companies advertise through the keyword method).
3 R. Charles Henn, Jr. et al., Protecting Collegiate Color Schemes: How Recent
Developments in Trademark Law Enable Institutions to Further Preserve and Strengthen
Their Brand Identities, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) ("Consumers' buying decisions
directly result from trademark owners' cultivation of brand identities and brand
personalities with which consumers desire to affiliate."). See also Desai, supra note 1, at
985 (explaining how brands function as information sources for preferences, desires, and
identity).
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Coca-Cola, and McDonald's 36 achieve their iconic status over time,
largely due to enormous investment and vigilant enforcement by
brand owners.
The investment includes not just building the brand names in
the marketplace, but also aggressive policing against any
unauthorized use.37 When a third party uses a mark that may
dilute the distinctiveness of the brand, the brand owner will lean
on trademark dilution law to enjoin the allegedly dilutive use.
Under trademark dilution law, dilutive use covers the types of
use that may likely cause tarnishment or blurring of the brand.38
Tarnishment involves the defendant's use of the brand in an
unwholesome way.39 For example, the Louis Vuitton brand owner
36 Apple ($98 billion), Google ($93 billion), Coca-Cola ($79 billion), Microsoft ($59 billion),
McDonald's ($42 billion), Samsung ($39 billion), Intel ($37 billion), BMW ($31 billion), and
Louis Vuitton ($24 billion) are among the top global brands. Aaron Taube, These Are the 20
Most Valuable Brands in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.bu
sinessinsider.com/these-are-the-20-most-valuable-brands-in-the-world-201 3 -9 ?op= 1.
31 Aggressive tactics or trademark bullying can also go too far and may cause unwanted
negative publicity. The Supreme Court in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 733-
34 (2013) recognizes the problem of trademark bullying:
Courts should be well aware that charges of trademark infringement can be
disruptive to the good business relations between the manufacturer alleged
to have been an infringer and its distributors, retailers, and investors. The
mere pendency of litigation can mean that other actors in the marketplace
may be reluctant to have future dealings with the alleged infringer. Nike
appears to have been well aware of that dynamic in this case.
See also Tamlin H. Bason, What Did We Learn from Already v. Nike?, BLOOMBERG BNA
INTELL. PROP. BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.bna.com/learn-already-nike-b17179871889/
(discussing trademark bullying tactics employed by brand owner Nike); Jesse Bidgood,
Chicken Chain Says Stop, but T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.ny
times.com2011/12/05/us/eat-more-kale-t-shirts-challenged-by-chick-fil-a.html? r0 (reporting
on the publicity relating to the fight between Chick-Fil-A and the Vermont artist's "Eat More
Kale" T-shirt).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) ("Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a
famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark
has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to
cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury."); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing
the federal trademark dilution statute).
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C)(D) C' '[Dlilution by tarnishment' is association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the
reputation of the famous mark."); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385
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brought an action under dilution law against a defendant for
tarnishing the distinctiveness of the Louis Vuitton brand by
adopting "Chewy Vuitton" for cheap dog toys.40
Blurring use of a brand involves "association arising from the
similarity between a mark. . . and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark," irrespective of "the presence
or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury."'41 In Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee,
Inc., Starbucks brought a blurring dilution claim against the
defendant for using the term "Charbucks" in connection with the
defendant's coffee products. 42 To succeed, the brand owner must
establish, through evidence as required by the statute, that there
is an association between the two marks4 3
The tarnishment and blurring grounds of dilution, however, are
only available to marks that have achieved the "famous" status
under the law.44 Very few trademarks can attain the "famous"
status, as the law is designed to extend protection only to the
special trademark that has become "widely recognized by the
general consuming public" as a source of goods or services. 45 In
other words, a famous mark must be a "household name."46 For
example, the owner of the trademark Louis Vuitton successfully
(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court decision that "Victor's Little Secret" tarnishes
the famous trademark Victoria's Secret).
40 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
Compare id. at 260-61 (finding successful defendant's argument that "Chewy Dog" was a
parody providing social commentary critical of today's material, status-obsessed consumer
culture), with V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 389 (finding that defendant's mark
raised a strong inference of tarnishment of plaintiffs brand through lewd or offensive
sexual association).
41 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(2).
42 736 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court's finding that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate likelihood of dilution by blurring because the association between
Starbucks and Charbucks is very weak).
43 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(l)-(2).
44 See Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir.
2005) ("The judicial consensus is that 'famous' is a rigorous standard.").
45 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (providing that "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark's owner").
46 See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
("A famous mark is one that has become a 'household name.'" (quoting Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004))).
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established that the mark is famous for protection under the
dilution law. 47 On the other hand, the trademark COACH for bags
has recently been found by the court as not sufficiently famous for
protection under trademark dilution law.48 Despite the COACH
brand owner's evidence of high volume of sales and advertising
figures, extensive unsolicited media attention, numerous federal
registrations, strong demand for joint marketing efforts, and
positive brand awareness survey results, the court held that the
evidence was insufficient to satisfy the requisite level of fame for a
dilution claim. 49
B. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Most brand owners rely on trademark infringement theory to
police and enforce their trademark rights against third-party use
that is likely to cause consumer confusion. 0 Under a trademark
infringement claim, brand owners do not have to prove that they
own a famous trademark. 51 They only need to establish that the
47 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d at 265 (noting that "LVM owns famous
marks that are distinctive" is not at issue for dilution claim purpose); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 172-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (remanding the case for the district court
to determine whether Rosetta Stone became famous by applying the statutory factors, even
though Rosetta Stone's brand awareness had reached 75% in 2009).
48 See Coach Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d at 1373-74 (finding substantial evidence to support
the conclusion that "CSI failed to show the requisite level of fame for dilution").
49 See id. at 1374-76 (analyzing each piece of evidence proffered by Coach and concluding
that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board did not err in its decision that Coach failed to
show fame for the dilution claim).
5o See, e.g., Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2013) (featuring a
competitor seeking a declaratory judgment to prove its mark does not infringe a preexisting
mark); Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013) (featuring an owner of a
motivational service business enforcing its right to the term "Own Your Power" against Oprah
Winfrey); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2013) (featuring
an owner of the trademark "Sealtight" protecting its product from being confused with a
product called "Sealtite"); Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44 (1st
Cir. 2013) (featuring a crystal figuring maker barring a reseller of its product from using its
name in an advertisement).
5' See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046,
1053 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board's ruling that
"BEGGIN' STRIPS, although not a famous mark, has enjoyed 'at least a high degree of
recognition' that has rendered the mark 'distinctive and strong and entitled to a broad level
of protection' "); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[L]ikelihood of confusion fame 'varies along a
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trademark is distinctive.5 2 A word, phrase, or symbol can be
deemed distinctive if it is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive.5 3 For
example, Apple is an arbitrary name for computers, as it has
absolutely no connection with computers when the brand owner
selects the word "apple" for computers.5 4 Clorox is a fanciful
trademark, because it is a coined term-a made-up, nonexistent
word when the brand owner creates the mark.5 5 Polar Bear is a
suggestive trademark for outerwear, as the mark is "connected
with the concept of cold weather and protection from the elements.
It suggests that the type of outerwear and boots sold by [the brand
owner] offer the sort of protection afforded by bears' skins."56
Words that describe figure, size, taste, function, or
characteristic of a product are not inherently distinctive and have
no protection under trademark law.57 Descriptive trademarks can
gain protection only if they have acquired secondary meaning,
becoming distinctive through years of use and achieving consumer
recognition as source identifiers.58 The burden is on the owner of
spectrum from very strong to very weak.'" (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
52 See Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1317
(1 1th Cir. 2012) ('The starting point for an assessment of the validity of a mark is to query
whether or not the purported mark is distinctive."); Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509
F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007) (nothing that distinctive trademarks are entitled to
protection).
53 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992).
51 See Icebreaker Ltd. v. Gilmar S.P.A., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 (D. Or. 2012)
(defining "arbitrary trademarks" as "actual words with no connection to the product" and
listing Apple computers and cancel cigarettes as prime examples) (quoting Entrepreneur
Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002)).
55 Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 134, 150 (D.
Mass. 2010) (noting that "Clorox" is a fanciful trademark).
56 Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. A.J. Sheepskin & Leather Outerwear, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 896, 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the trademark composing of the word "bear," along with the image
of a polar bear, a suggestive mark for outerwear and boots). See also Heartland Animal
Clinic, P.A. v. Heartland SPCA Animal Med. Ctr., LLC, 503 Fed. App'x 616, 619-20 (10th
Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court's finding that the mark "Heartland" for animal clinic
services is suggestive); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (a suggestive mark is "deemed inherently
distinctive and [is] entitled to protection").
51 Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that a
descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive because it "merely describe[s] a function, use,
characteristic, size, or intended purpose of the product").
58 To prove that a descriptive mark has become distinctive or has acquired a "secondary
meaning," the brand owner must establish that "a substantial number of present or
prospective customers understand the designation when used in connection with a business
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the descriptive trademark to demonstrate the acquisition of a
distinctive secondary meaning through direct evidence of
consumer survey or indirect evidence such as sale volume,
advertisement expenditure, and unsolicited media coverage.5 9 For
example, Coca-Cola as a name for beverages from the cola nut tree
has become "the paradigm of a descriptive mark" that has acquired
distinctiveness. 60
The owner of an arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive trademark, or
descriptive trademark with secondary meaning, can assert
trademark infringement against a third party's use that is likely to
cause consumer confusion. 61 Courts typically apply a list of factors
in analyzing whether there is likelihood of consumer confusion
between the brand owner's trademark and the defendant's
trademark. 62 Overall, the likelihood of consumer confusion test is
factually intensive and costly for brand owners.63 Unfortunately, if
to refer to a particular person or business enterprise." Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc.,
915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp.,
301 F.2d 156, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962)); see also George &
Co. v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 394 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Descriptive marks are
not inherently distinctive; rather, they require a sharing of secondary meaning before they
receive trademark protection." (citing Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 364 F.3d 535,
538 (4th Cir. 2004))).
59 See Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bos. Beer Co. v.
Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1993)) (stating that secondary meaning can
be established "through the use of direct evidence, such as consumer surveys or testimony
from consumers," or through circumstantial evidence regarding: "(1) the length and manner
of its use, (2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the mark and (3) the
efforts made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the public's mind,
between the name or mark and a particular product or venture.").
60 Sara Lee, 81 F.3d at 464.
6, See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1354-56 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (discussing the relevant factors used in determining the likelihood of consumer
confusion); Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing
the factors of consumer confusion and noting that the owner of arbitrary, fanciful,
suggestive, or descriptive trademarks can assert trademark infringement).
62 See Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel MeliA, Inc., 728 F.3d 55, 65 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying the First
Circuit's "Pignons factors" of (1) similarity of marks, (2) similarity of goods or, in service
mark cases, services, (3) relationship between parties' channels of trade, (4) juxtaposition of
parties' advertising, (5) classes of prospective purchasers, (6) evidence of actual confusion,
(7) defendant's intent in adopting its allegedly infringing mark, and (8) strength of
plaintiffs mark, in determining likelihood of consumer confusion).
63 See id. at 66 ("Because the likelihood of confusion analysis is a particularly fact-
intensive one, resolving this issue on summary judgment is disfavored."); Oriental Fin.
416 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:399
the brand owner fails to prosecute a third party's infringing use of
the protected trademark, there is a strong risk of weakening the
strength of the trademark 64 and losing the trademark rights
through abandonment. 65
C. UNFAIR COMPETITION
The goodwill and reputation associated with a trademark are
accumulated through years of use and advertisement of the
trademark in the marketplace. 66 Consequently, trademark right is
based on actual use of the trademark in connection with products
or services in commerce. 67 That also means trademark rights are
not afforded to those who quickly rush to the United States
Trademark Office first for registration without actual use of the
Grp., Inc. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Oriental, 698 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that the likelihood of confusion factors test is "a highly fact-intensive inquiry").
64 See Taza Sys., LLC v. Taza 21 Co., No. 2:11cv073, 2013 WL 5145859, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 13, 2013) (recognizing that "the presence of many users in the national marketplace
could demonstrate that the mark, although valid and enforceable, is weak and entitled to
limited protection against only exact, or near-exact, third-party uses").
65 See Milacron LLC v. Stough Tool Sales, No. 1:12-CV-119, 2012 WL 2366639, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio June 21, 2012) (noting that under the trademark statute, "[w]hen any course of
conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used
or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark," abandonment of the trademark occurs
without the trademark owner's intent to abandon the trademark).
66 Courts recognize that brand owners expend significant resources to build the goodwill
in brands and often take note of the expenditures in fashioning damages in trademark
infringement and unfair competition cases. See Smith Corona Corp. v. Pelikan, Inc., 784 F.
Supp. 452, 476 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) ("[1]n order to calculate damage to a corporation's
goodwill due to a competitor's false advertising, one must take into account the amount of
money expended by the injured corporation in the promotion of its trademark."); see also
Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (observing that the
district court "noted the significant and 'voluminous' evidence concerning Skydive Arizona's
'stellar business reputation,' and the hundreds of thousands of dollars Skydive Arizona
spent in developing and advertising its business in awarding damages").
67 See Ross v. Roberts, 478 F. App'x 426, 427 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[O]nly lawful use in
commerce can establish trademark rights." (citing CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., 474
F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007))); Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 654 F.3d
1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Actual substantive rights to a trademark arise based on its
use in commerce and its distinctiveness."); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus,
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.... [The right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption.").
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mark in commerce. 68 In fact, registration is not required for
trademark protection in the United States.
69
To protect the public and the trademark owner's investment in
a trademark, regardless of registration, unfair competition law
prevents a third party from using a mark that is likely to cause
false association or mislead the consumer. 70 In 1946, the Lanham
Act codified unfair competition law relating to third-party use of
names, logos, and phrases in sales and advertisements. 71 The
federal unfair competition statute is broad in scope, covering the
defendant's use of a mark or symbol that causes false
representation, false advertisement, and misrepresentation of "the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities."
72
68 See In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing the Patent
Trademark Office's rules about "the trademark owner's rights, which are based on use of
the mark and identification of the goods, not on the class in which the mark is registered").
69 See Gen. Healthcare Ltd. v. Qashat, 364 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Trademark
rights may arise under either the Lanham Act or under common law, but in either
circumstance, the right is conditioned upon use in commerce."); Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Trademark ownership is
always appurtenant to commercial activity. Thus, actual and continuous use is required to
acquire and retain a protectible interest in a mark.").
70 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) ("Traditional
trademark infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition that has its
sources in English common law, and was largely codified in the Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act)." (citations omitted)), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1125(c) (2012), as recognized in Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011); Petroliam Nasional
Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., passed in 1946, codified the then existing common law of trademarks,
which in turn was based on the tort of unfair competition.").
71 See Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat'l Distrib. Co., 520 F.3d 393, 397
(5th Cir. 2008) ("The Lanham Act codified and unified the common law on unfair
competition and trademark protection, and through several amendments since its adoption
in 1946, remains the principal statutory protection of trademarks.").
72 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). The Act provides in pertinent provisions:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
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A brand owner, in asserting claims against third-party use of a
similar mark, can avail to unfair competition law, and in some
cases, both trademark infringement and unfair competition
provisions of the Lanham Act. 73 Courts apply the same likelihood
of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement to unfair
competition cases. 74 If the evidence warrants it, courts do not
hesitate to uphold verdicts with large damages against defendants
for intentionally harming the goodwill and reputation of the
plaintiffs trademark through false or misleading representation
and advertisement. 75
In addition to federal claims, brand owners can look to state law
for unfair competition against third parties for engaging in passing
off or palming off the goodwill of the trademark.7 6 For instance,
under New York state law of unfair competition, courts recognize
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id. § 1125(a).
73 See, e.g., Secular Orgs. for Sobriety, Inc. v. Ullrich, 213 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the plaintiff asserted both trademark infringement and unfair competition
claims against the defendant); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 160 F.3d 911, 914
(2d Cir. 1998) (same).
74 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe test for liability is likelihood of confusion: '[Under the Lanham Act
[§ 43(a)], the ultimate test is whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the
similarity of the marks.... Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair competition
or false designation of origin, the test is identical-is there a 'likelihood of confusion?'"
(citation omitted)); Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[WIe use the
same test to decide whether there has been trademark infringement, unfair competition, or
false designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the two marks.").
75 See Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding a
jury verdict of $10 million in damages in a trademark infringement and false advertisement
case).
76 See, e.g., Automobili Lamborghini, S.p.A. v. Sangiovese, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-1154-KJD-
CWH, 2013 WL 5371421, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2013) (enforcing an injunction that
prohibited "engaging in any activity constituting unfair competition with Lamborghini, or
constituting an infringement of any or all of Lamborghini's Marks, or of Lamborghini's
rights in, or to use or exploit, any or all of Lamborghini's Marks or engage in any activity
that deceives the public and/or the trade, including, without limitation, palming-off or the
use of design elements and designations associated with Lamborghini or Lamborghini's
marks").
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both palming off and misappropriation. 77  New York defines
"palming off' as "the sale of the goods of one manufacturer as
those of another."78  New York law even extends protection to
brands that have no secondary meaning, as long as there is
evidence of a third party's intent to trade off on the goodwill and
reputation of the name. 79 Obviously, in state unfair competition
cases, the brand owner must establish that it suffers losses
directly from the defendant's palming-off conduct.80
In summary, a brand owner can rely on trademark dilution,
trademark infringement, and unfair competition law to police and
enforce its trademark rights against third-party use to protect its
substantial investment in building the goodwill in the brand.
D. TRADEMARK LITIGATION COSTS
Brand owners, relying on federal and state law to protect and
enforce their rights in brands, incur significant costs in trademark
litigation. According to the American Intellectual Property Law
Association's 2013 Report of the Economic Survey, average
litigation costs in 2012 for a trademark litigation ranged from
$375,000 when less than $1 million was in controversy to $2
77 See Yantha v. Omni Childhood Ctr., Inc., No. 13-CV-1948, 2013 WL 5327516, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013) ("New York recognizes two theories of common-law unfair
competition: palming off and misappropriation."); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d
817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) ("The essence of an unfair competition claim is that the defendant
assembled a product which bears so striking a resemblance to the plaintiffs product that
the public will be confused as to the identity of the products.").
78 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 858 (N.Y. 2007) (footnote omitted)
("'Palming off-that is, the sale of the goods of one manufacturer as those of another-was
the first theory of unfair competition endorsed by New York courts, and 'has been
extended ... to situations where the parties are not even in competition." (quoting
Electrolux Corp. v. ValWorth, Inc., 161 N.E.2d 197, 203 (N.Y. 1959))).
79 See Lincoln Rest. Corp. v. Wolfies Rest. Inc., 291 F.2d 302, 303 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating
that even without secondary meaning, "intent to trade on plaintiffs' reputation and
plaintiffs' name was specifically found, and we see no distinction between this and ordinary
'palming off ").
80 See Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, 820 F. Supp. 2d 429, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that
the plaintiff must show "that defendant diverted plaintiffs customers and business"); Coca-
Cola N. Am. v. Crawley Juice, Inc., No. 09 CV 3259, 2011 WL 1882845, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May
17, 2011) (requiring that, to state a claim for unfair competition, a plaintiff must allege
either a "direct financial loss, lost dealings, or... [lost] profits resulting from the
'anticompetitive acts' at issue" (quoting CA, Inc. v. Simple.Com, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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million when more than $25 million was in controversy. 81 The
costs include "outside and local counsel, associates, paralegal
services, travel and living expenses, fees and costs for court
reporters, copies, couriers, exhibit preparation, analytical testing,
expert witnesses, translators, surveys, jury advisors, and similar
expenses."82
To limit harms to the goodwill of a trademark and to control
litigation costs, many brand owners often seek a preliminary
injunction in the early stages of trademark litigation.83  A
preliminary injunction serves two purposes. First, brand owners
want to stop as early as possible the harms to the goodwill of the
brand inflicted by unauthorized third-party use of the brand. The
injury is irreparable because there is already a likelihood of
consumer confusion as to the source of the products or services. 84
Damages to the goodwill of the brand are difficult to measure, and
monetary damages are inadequate to make the brand owner whole
again when the harms occur.85 A preliminary injunction can curb
the harms prior to trial.86 Second, the costs incurred at the
preliminary injunction stage are significantly less than those
81 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013), http://www.pat
entinsurance.com/custdocs/2013AIPLA%20survey.pdf.
82 Id.
83 See Meredith Wilkes & Anna E. Raimer, Preliminary Injunctions in U.S. Trademark
Infringement Cases and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm, 68(3) INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N
BULL. (INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N), Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Preli
minarylnjunctionsinUSTrademarklnfringementCasesandthePresumptionoflrreparableHarm.
aspx (detailing grounds for a preliminary injunction, including different approaches to show
irreparable harm).
84 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement
Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 4-5 (2009) ("Like trying to un-ring a
bell, trying to use dollars to 'compensate' after the fact for damage to business goodwill and
reputation cannot constitute fair or full compensation. Damage to business reputation and
good will is inherently 'irreparable.' ").
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1 ("Getting a preliminary injunction means that the trademark owner can force
the alleged infringer to immediately stop all use of the challenged mark and undergo an
expensive change to a significantly different mark. That change will last for the months or
years that will ensue until all the issues can be hashed out in a full-fledged trial on the
merits. In some situations, getting a preliminary injunction means that the trademark
owner will immediately receive just about all the relief it would be entitled to even after a
win on the merits at trial.").
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incurred when the case proceeds to trial.8 7 The majority of cases
settle after the issuance of a preliminary injunction before trial,
reducing litigation costs. 88
E. TRADE DRESS PROTECTION
The anti-dilution, infringement, and unfair competition causes
of action are also available to trade dress. Trade dress is the total
look and feel, appearance, or image of a product or service.8 9 For
example, in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, the Supreme Court
extended the protection available to trademarks under the
Lanham Act to the look and feel of a fast food restaurant.90 As
long as a trade dress is inherently distinctive and non-functional, 91
it enjoys the same protection available to trademarks. 92 Indeed,
the owner of a trade dress can seek injunctive relief and damages
in the form of defendant's profits and enhanced damages for willful
87 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, supra note 81 (showing that the costs of trademark
litigation at the end of the full survey are less than going to trial, indicating that costs at
preliminary injunction are even less).
88 Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell To Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in
Constitutional Litigation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 743, 746-47 n.8 (2012).
89 See Trade Dress, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N (Nov. 2015), http://www.inta.orgfrademark
Basics/FastSheets/PageslTrade-Dress.aspx ("Trade dress is the overall image (look and feel)
of a product and distinguishes it from those of others.").
- 505 U.S. 763, 775-76 (affirming the Fifth Circuit's finding that Taco Cabana's trade
dress was inherently distinctive and required no secondary meaning, thereby providing
protection to Taco Cabana's "look and feel"). See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Should It Be
a Free for All? The Challenge of Extending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of
Web Sites in the Evolving Internet, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1233 (2000) (discussing the grounds
and challenges associated with extending trade dress law to protect websites).
91 "Substantively, the trade dress must be both distinctive ... and nonfunctional (i.e., not
be essential to the use of purpose of, and not affect the cost or quality of, the product or
service) [to be registerable]. Functional trade dress is not registerable .... " Trade Dress,
supra note 89; see, e.g., Fruit-Ices Corp. v. Coolbrands Int'l, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 412
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs trade dress for frozen fruit bars is entitled to
protection, because it is inherently distinctive and non-functional). Mattel, Inc. v. MGA
Entm't, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (articulating the established test of
inherently distinctive trade dress).
92 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (stating that there is no distinction under the Lanham Act
for the protection of inherently distinctive trademarks and trade dress); see also
Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The difference
between trade dress and trademark is no longer of importance in determining whether
trade dress is protected by federal law. Trade dress, regardless of whether it is registered,
is protectable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).").
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infringement of the trade dress. 93 The seminal decision in Two
Pesos expands legal protection to new trade dress, ranging from
the look and feel of a website 94 to packaging designs for crayons.95
As with trademarks, an owner of a trade dress can seek
registration of the trade dress with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.96
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR BRANDING CONTENT
Copyright law protects original content fixed in a tangible
medium. 97  As long as the content contains a modicum of
creativity, the content is eligible for copyright protection.98 The
duration of copyright protection is significantly long. For example,
93 See Djarum v. Dhanraj Imports, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669-70 (W.D.N.C. 2012)
(ordering a permanent injunction, disgorgement of the defendant's profits, and treble
damages against the defendant in a case where the defendant had intentionally infringed
the plaintiffs trade dress for a cigar packaging design).
94 See Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072,
at *21 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (recognizing trade dress protection for the plaintiffs website
upon observing that "[1]ike the packaging of a product, the look and feel of a web site invites
the user in. It offers a familiar interface, with recognizable elements. Similar colors, sizes,
and layouts make navigation and interaction facile."); Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (W.D. Wash. 2007) ("[D]efendant has cited no authority for proposition
that plaintiff cannot qualify its trade dress description as one seeking protection for the
'look and feel' of its website in response to a motion to dismiss.").
95 See Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that
'each line having its own distinctive packaging, and if the packaging of each line has its
own 'consistent overall look,' then the packaging of each line would constitute recognizable
trade dress regardless of whether the packaging of the three lines together have a
'consistent overall look' and regardless of whether some crayons were packaged in other
types of packaging").
9 See Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 868 (noting that the trade dress in the present case had
been registered and therefore enjoyed all the benefits available for registered trademarks).
Registration of a distinctive trade dress prohibits trade dress that is "as a whole functional"
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307,
310 (4th Cir. 2014).
97 The 1976 Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret
Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2014) (comparing copyright protection to
different types of intellectual property).
98 Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product
Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1910 (2014) (stating that in a
vast majority of cases, copyright protection is available if a work is "merely to be
independently created rather than copied, and... exhibit[s] a modicum of creativity, one
small enough to be present" (footnote omitted)).
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the term of copyright protection for individual authors is the life of
the author plus seventy years. 99 For entity authors who hire
others to create works of authorship, the duration is ninety-five
years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is
shorter.100 Ownership of a copyright means having a bundle of
exclusive rights, including the exclusive right to make copies,
prepare derivative works, distribute the works, publicly perform
the work, and publicly display the work.101 Copyright owners can
bring infringement litigation against others for violation of any of
the exclusive rights.
Branding content in traditional mediums such as billboards,
catalogs, flyers, newspapers, and trade journals is protected under
copyright law. 10 2  This content is typically in the form of
photographs, collages, or combinations of pictures and text in
prints.10 3 The content, of course, often includes the name of the
brand, logos, or phrases. The arrival of the Internet has
revolutionized branding content and the means to deliver content
in recent years.10 4 Online branding content is now a combination
99 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113
MICH. L. REV. 231, 261 (2014) (recognizing the "extremely long duration of copyright
protection" and proposing different packages of terms of protection, with the minimum
package having a very short minimum term of one to five years and the maximum package
having the "maximum terms of 70 years plus life, 120 years from creation, or 95 years from
publication"); Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 Wis. L. REv. 219, 222-
43 (tracing the history of the duration of copyright protection after the life of the author).
100 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012); see also Joshua L. Simmons, Inventions Made For Hire, 2
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 6-7 (2012) (discussing works made for hire under
copyright law).
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing the exclusive rights); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61
(1976) ("These exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called 'bundle of rights' that is a
copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases."); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons,
Love's Labor's Lost: Marry for Love, Copyright Work Made-for-Hire, and Alienate at Your
Leisure, 101 KY. L.J. 113, 117-18 (2013) (discussing copyright ownership).
102 See, e.g., Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992)
(exemplifying protection of branding content in catalogs under copyright law); Kleier
Adver., Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1990) (in billboards);
Inkadinkado, Inc. v. Meyer, No. CIV.A. 03-10332-GAO, 2003 WL 22282177, at *3 (D. Mass.
Sept. 16, 2003) (in collages).
101 See, e.g., Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 2007); Gener-Villar v. Adcom
Grp., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 112, 126 (D. P.R. 2008).
104 See BARNARD, supra note 20 (noting that globally, the Internet continues to dominate
as the medium of choice for advertisements).
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of software, images, and text. 05 A video clip advertisement to be
delivered via smartphones or desktops is one example of such a
combination.106 A game created for advertisement purposes is
another example of multimedia, interactive software.10 7 Yet
another example of the software-images-text combination is an
app designed to build brand loyalty.108 Branding content has
proliferated with the explosion of mobile devices in addition to the
widely available, ubiquitous desktop computer. 0 9
In summary, branding serves to build the goodwill in a brand,
name, or logo. Trademark law extends protection to the brands,
for purposes of protecting both the consumer and the brand
owner's investment.110  Copyright law protects the branding
content, whether such content is a photograph, collage, video
game, software, or some combination thereof"' Enforcement costs
105 See Scott Scanlon, The Ultimate List of Content Curation Tools and Platforms,
YoUBRAND, http://www.youbrandinc.com/ultimate-lists/ultimate-list-content-curation-tools-
platform/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2012) (listing various online sources that facilitate curation
of content to aid marketing strategy).
106 See, e.g., Elisha Hartwig, The Art of the Branded Video, MASHABLE (Nov. 29, 2013),
http://mashable.com/2013/1 1/29/video-views-completion-metricst#OOE4nxqL4-aql (describing
the importance of a video that resonates with the audience in building a brand); Liza
Brown, How to Add Logo to Video Quickly and Easily, WONDERSHARE (Apr. 28, 2015, 8:29
PM), http://www.wondershare.com/video-editing-tipsladd-logo-to-video.html ("[Pleople in
today's world tend to distinguish themselves in various ways, including the video
creation."); Mark Montgomery, Branding with Bugs, VIDEOMAKER (Mar. 1, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.videomaker.comlarticle/14602-branding-with-bugs (describing the importance of
the addition of bugs, "graphical element[s] that usually display[ ] in or around a given
corner of the viewable area of the video," to videos for branding purposes).
107 See Steve Hicks, Does the Video Game Industry Hold the Keys to the Future of
Advertising? Engage Consumers via Brain Chemistry, ADWEEK (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:04 AM),
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/engage-consumers-brain-chemistry- 155
531 ("The next generation of marketing innovation belongs, not to those who bring their
advertising to the game, but to those who know how to bring the game to their
advertising.").
108 See e.g., Your Branding, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://www.androiddocs.com/design/st
ylelbranding.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (describing the different styles available for
branding in an Android app).
109 See BARNARD, supra note 20 ("Mobile advertising (by which we mean all internet ads
delivered to smartphones and tablets, whether display, classified or search, and including
in-app ads) has now only taken off and is growing six times faster than desktop internet.").
110 See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1616 (2010)
("[Tirademark law protects a brand's proprietary, source-identifying function.").
I See Meghan L. Collins, Still Standing, New Branding: Corporate Crossroads of
Shaping a Modern Brand While Protecting Intellectual Property, 17 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 197, 219
(2015) (stating that "copyright law protects creative works" of brand).
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relating to brands under both trademark and copyright laws
typically command a high monetary sum. 112
V. TAX TREATMENT OF BRAND BUILDING AND ENFORCEMENT
A. GENERAL TAX FRAMEWORK
In business, one must spend money to make money. Tax rules
recognize this, and permit deductions for certain outlays:
The income tax is ostensibly a tax on net income. That
is, it only attempts to tax the net increase in wealth
generated by money making activities. This implies
that we should be entitled to deduct the money we
spend from the money we make before we apply the
tax rates to the remainder. In general this is what the
tax rules try to do. 113
For the most part, the key rules for deducting expenses arising
from money-making efforts are straightforward. Section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) authorizes the deduction of ordinary
and necessary expenses arising from the carrying on of any trade
or business."14 Additionally, section 212 authorizes the deduction
of ordinary and necessary expenses related to investment
activities.1 5  But there are some interesting complexities in
112 For trademark and copyright infringement cases, if the controversy is less than $1
million, the cost of litigation for each case is about $375,000. The cost will double if the
controversy is above $1 million. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N, supra note 81.
"1 See JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 95 (3d ed. 2013). For example, a business that is conducted
through the activities of its employees is entitled to deduct the reasonable salaries of those
employees from its gross income in determining its taxable income. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West
Supp. 2015).
114 I.R.C. § 162. Since the inception of the modern income tax, the Code has permitted a
current deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses. Revenue Act of 1913, ch.
16, § 11(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 ("[1In computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax
there shall be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in carrying
on any business....").
11 I.R.C. § 212. The need for a separate provision addressing investment activities arose
from an early Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that buying and selling
stocks and other investment activities did not constitute a trade or business, and therefore,
what is now section 162 did not apply to the expenses arising from those activities. Higgins
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reaching a fair result with respect to business and investment
deductions. 116 Most notably, since the inception of the modern
income tax, the Code has precluded a current deduction for so-
called "capital expenditures."' 117
A point of importance lies in understanding how deductible
"expenses" differ from nondeductible "capital expenditures." In
general, an immediately deductible expense is a cost that benefits
the current year only." 8 A nondeductible capital expenditure is a
cost that benefits more than the current year." 9  Thus, for
example, when a business chooses to license trademark rights
from a third party, the annual royalty paid can be deducted
immediately since it only helps produce income in the current
year. 20 On the other hand, when a business buys a trademark for
use in its business, the cost of the trademark is a capital
expenditure that cannot be deducted in the current year, because
v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941). Congress responded by enacting what is now section
212 to allow for the deduction of those expenses.
116 This area is inherently complex. An area of continuing development and uncertainty is
the meaning and application of the phrase "ordinary and necessary" as used in the statute. In
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933), the seminal case interpreting that phrase,
the Supreme Court held that to be "ordinary," the expense must be customary or expected in
the life of the business. See also Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) ("Ordinary has
the connotation of normal, usual or customary."). The term "necessary" was interpreted by the
Court in Welch to mean "appropriate and helpful." Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations define the term "trade or business." In
considering the meaning of the term, the Supreme Court has generally concluded that to be
engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity
and regularity, and the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for
income or profit. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). Whether a taxpayer has
engaged in the requisite scope of activities and has demonstrated the requisite profit motive
are questions to be determined by the facts in each case. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217.
117 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (providing "[tihat no deduction
shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements, or
betterments, made to increase the value of any property"). For the current disallowance
provisions, see I.R.C. § 263(a).
11 See I.R.C. § 162(a) (stating that expenses "paid or incurred during the taxable year" are
deductible (emphasis added)).
119 See Capital Asset Costs Are Not Deductible as Business Expenses, BUSINESS OWNER'S
TOOLKIT (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.bizfihings.comltoolkit/sbg/tax-info/fed-taxes/cost-of-cap
ital-assets-not-deductible-expense.aspx ("A capital asset is an asset that benefits your
business for more than one year.").
120 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (including "other payments required to be made as a condition to
the continued use of possession" as a deductible expense).
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the trademark will help produce income over many years. 121 As
illustrated, even an expenditure that is clearly for the purpose of
making money may not be currently deductible if the expenditure
will help produce income over a longer period of time than the
current year.
Distinguishing immediately deductible expenses from
nondeductible capital expenditures can be difficult. Throughout
the years, the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the law in
this area, often creating further controversy and confusion in the
process. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, the
Supreme Court concluded that an expenditure that serves to
create or enhance a separate and distinct asset must be
capitalized.122 The Court noted:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have
some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond
the taxable year. What is important and controlling,
we feel, is that the... payment serves to create or
enhance for [the taxpayer] what is essentially a
separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an
inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in
nature and not an expense.... 123
In a later decision, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, the
Supreme Court minimized the importance of the separate-and-
distinct-asset test of Lincoln Savings and expanded the test for
121 If the costs incurred to purchase a trademark were deductible in full in the current
year, there would be a mismatching of income and expense that produced such income;
income would be understated in the year of acquisition and overstated in later years. By
prohibiting the immediate deduction of capital expenditures, this problem is avoided. It
should be noted that the purchaser will recover its costs for the trademark over time
through amortization deductions. I.R.C. § 197, discussed infra notes 140-44 and
accompanying text.
122 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971). See generally Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital
Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443 (1974)
(discussing the court's decision in Lincoln Savings).
123 403 U.S. at 354.
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capitalization.1 24 The Supreme Court used broad language to
emphasize that any expenditure producing benefits beyond the
current taxable year may require capitalization. 25  As noted
above, the Supreme Court had previously held that an expenditure
that serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset must
be capitalized. 126 In INDOPCO, the Court held that, although the
separate-and-distinct-asset standard is a sufficient condition for
capitalization, it is not a necessary condition, and an expenditure
giving rise to benefits may require capitalization, whether or not
the expenditure gives rise to a separate and distinct asset. 27
INDOPCO did not involve an expenditure relating to
branding. 28 As most costs associated with branding produce
benefits in current and future years, such costs would seemingly
fall within the expansive thrust of INDOPCO and would be
required to be capitalized. 29 Branding is inherently designed to
124 503 U.S. 79, 86-90 (1992). The taxpayer in INDOPCO, a publicly-held corporation
incurred expenses (various investment banker, legal, and consulting fees) in connection
with a friendly merger offer from another company. The taxpayer sought to deduct the fees
as current expenses. The Court held the fees were not currently deductible, but rather had
to be capitalized under section 263. Id. at 90.
125 The Supreme Court noted:
Although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit ... may not
warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year
in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in
determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction
or capitalization .... Indeed, the text of the Code's capitalization provision,
§263(a)(1), which refers to "permanent improvements or betterments," itself
envisions an inquiry into the duration and extent of the benefits realized by
the taxpayer.
Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the
transaction (merger) produced significant benefits that would be realized by the taxpayer,
or by the merged entity, in future years. Id. at 88.
126 Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354.
127 INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87-88. "It by no means follows, however, that only
expenditures that create or enhance separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under
section 263." Id. at 86-87.
128 INDOPCO involved various investment banking, legal, and consulting expenditures
related to the merger. Id. at 81-82.
129 A number of pre-INDOPCO cases held that certain costs associated with trademarks
and trade names should be capitalized, but INDOPCO seemingly required almost all costs
associated with trademarks and trade names to be capitalized, including costs, such as
ordinary brand advertising costs, that were previously viewed as deductible. See, e.g.,
Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
costs of protecting a trademark from cancellation must be capitalized), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
428
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produce future benefits for a business. 130 Costs of developing
brands often produce benefits that give rise to distinctive
intellectual property assets such as trade dress, trademarks, trade
names, and copyrights that continue well beyond the current
taxable year. 131 Legal costs of enforcing brands secure these
benefits; specifically, such costs can increase the value of brands
and make a taxpayer's interest in them more secure by
eliminating the possibility of having the taxpayer's brand impaired
by competitors and by deterring attempts to have the taxpayer's
legal rights in brands challenged. 132
If capitalization-in contrast to current expensing-is required
for any costs associated with branding, the tax query would then
shift to whether such costs may be recovered over time through tax
depreciation deductions. In an economic sense, depreciation is the
decline in value of an asset due to wear and tear and
obsolescence.133 In the tax sense, depreciation is a deduction from
income to permit the taxpayer to recover the cost of that asset.134
If we seek to match our capital expenditures against the revenues
they helped produce, we must spread out the deduction over the
u~eful life of the asset.135 The problem with many intellectual
property assets produced from branding activities, such as
trademarks, trade names, and goodwill, is that they do not have a
determinable useful life over which capitalized costs may be
recovered. For this reason, trademarks, trade names, goodwill,
and other intangible assets with indeterminate lives were viewed
945 (1974); Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that the costs
of trademark infringement litigation must be capitalized).
130 See generally discussion supra Part II.
131 See generally discussion supra Part III.
132 See, e.g., supra notes 83-88, 93 and accompanying text (illustrating how litigation
intended to protect brands through various means can increase broad value).
1' See A Brief Overview of Tax Depreciation, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Busi
nesses-&-Self-EmployedlA-Brief-Overview-of-Depreciation (last visited Jan. 2, 2016) (stating
that tax deductions for depreciation are an "annual allowance for the wear and tear,
deterioration, or obsolescence of the property").
3 4 Id. ("Depreciation is an income tax deduction that allows a taxpayer to rework the cost
of other basis of certain property ... for the wear and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence of
the property.").
135 Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122, 126 (1960) ("[Ihe purpose of depreciation
accounting is to allocate the expense of using an asset to the various periods which are
benefited by that asset.").
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as nondepreciable assets at the time of the INDOPCO decision in
1992.136
On occasion, Congress has carved out limited statutory
exceptions for trademarks and trade names (but not goodwill),
permitting recovery of certain costs through annual deductions.
Between 1956 and 1986, for instance, Congress amended the
Internal Revenue Code to allow a taxpayer to elect to depreciate
over five years certain costs incurred in connection with the
acquisition, protection, expansion, registration, or defense of a
trademark.'37 Between 1969 and 1993, Congress allowed the cost
of certain acquired trademarks and trade names to be amortized
over either ten or twenty-five years, depending on the
circumstances. 138 Yet when these special depreciation rules were
136 Under early tax depreciation rules, an intangible asset was subject to a depreciation
allowance if it was "known from experience or other factors to be of use in the business or in
the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which may be estimated
with reasonable accuracy...." Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004). An
intangible asset, the useful life of which was not determinable, was not subject to the
allowance for depreciation. Id. Under this framework, patents and copyrights were
considered depreciable, but trademarks, trade names, and goodwill were not. See Gen.
Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Minn. 1978) ("Where the useful
life of an intangible asset is clearly limited to a defined period as is the case with patents
and copyrights, depreciation is available without question...." (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)-
3)), affd, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979).
137 Congress enacted section 177 in 1956. Act of June 29, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-629, § 4(a),
70 Stat. 404, 406 (1956). Before enactment of section 177, expenditures paid in connection
with trademarks and trade names, such as legal fees, were not currently deductible and
were not recoverable under early tax depreciation rules, because trademarks and trade
names have indeterminable useful lives. S. REP. No. 84-191, at 8 (1956). Certain large
corporations, which had in-house legal staff handling trademark and trade name matters,
avoided this result by deducting compensation with respect to these matters because of
difficulties of identification. Id. Smaller companies, which could not afford to maintain
their own legal staff, had to pay outside counsel or consultants to perform functions related
to trademarks and trade names and were required to capitalize such expenses. Id. at 8-9.
Section 177 was enacted as an attempt to eliminate the existing hardship and inequities
facing small corporations. Id. Section 177 was repealed in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 241(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2181 (1986). The tax rule for trademark and
trade name expenditures was viewed as inappropriate for a number of reasons: the
possibility that large companies were finding a way to deduct otherwise capital
expenditures did not justify an amortization election for all; a five-year amortization only
partially alleviated any unfairness; and there was no basis for a presumption that
investment in trademarks and trade names produced social benefits that market forces
might adequately reflect. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 256 (1985).
138 Section 1253, enacted in 1969, provided a new set of tax rules governing acquisitions of
trademarks and trade names. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 1253, 83 Stat.
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not in force or were inapplicable, capitalized trademark and trade
name costs were not depreciable, as trademarks and trade names
have indeterminate lives.139
In 1993, a year after INDOPCO was decided, Congress, in a
major shift in tax policy, enacted section 197 to simplify the law
and minimize disputes regarding the depreciation of intangibles. 40
Section 197 provides a single depreciation method (straight line
depreciation) and a single recovery period (fifteen years) for the
487, 647-48 (1969). Section 1253 provided that a trademark transferee could amortize a
lump sum payment over the lesser of the term of the trademark agreement if the agreement
had a limited term often years. See I.R.C. § 1253(d)(2) (1969) (providing for amortization of
the cost of a trademark or trade name if, pursuant to section 1253(a), the transfer of the
trademark was not treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset). In 1989, Congress
amended section 1253, limiting the ten-year amortization rule for lump sum amounts to
transactions in which the lump sum amount paid did not exceed $100,000, and providing a
new twenty-five year amortization period for fixed sum amounts exceeding $100,000.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7622(a)-(c), 103 Stat.
2106, 2377-78.
1 Mary LaFrance, Days of Our Lives: The Impact of Section 197 on the Depreciation of
Copyrights, Patents, and Related Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 321 (1995).
140 See id. at 320 ("Congress enacted section 197 in order to simplify the rules for
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of controversies arising from the need to
determine which intangibles are depreciable and what their recovery periods should be.").
One problem with the historic tax regime for intangibles was that it caused much litigation
concerning the identification of intangible assets and their useful lives. See id. (stating that
the vagueness of the standard for determining intangibles "led to frequent administrative
appeals and litigation"). Of course, taxpayers who had the resources to litigate over the
identification, valuation, and establishment of limited useful lives of intangibles were better
off than those taxpayers who lacked resources. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
103D CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993, at 147
(Comm. Print 1993) (explaining that Congress created section 197 to eliminate considerable
confusion over the federal tax treatment of amortizable intangible assets); see also
Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: § 197 of the Internal
Revenue Code Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918 (1995) ("Because the
determination of whether an intangible can be amortized was a question of fact, the
outcome of such litigation varied widely according to the circumstances of each particular
case."). Another problem stemmed from the fact that the rule for recovering costs of
acquired intangible assets differed dramatically from the corresponding set of rules for
recovering the costs of acquired tangible assets. This disparate treatment between
intangible and tangible assets created distortions that were unfair to taxpayers. See Kevin
R. Conzelmann, Amortization of Intangibles, 533-2d TAX MGMT. PORT. A-3 & n.7 (2001)
(detailing the distortions caused by treating intangible and tangible assets differently);
Allen Walburn, Depreciation of Intangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need of Change, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453, 454-56 (1993) (explaining that the inequity between similarly
situated taxpayers resulted in noncompliance and much litigation, which unnecessarily
burdened the administration of tax law).
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capitalized costs associated with many types of intangible assets,
including trademarks, trade names, and goodwill. 141 The fifteen-
year recovery period was not based on any measure of actual
usefulness of intangibles in a business but was chosen because it
was the shortest period that would not have a negative revenue
impact. 142 Although not all types of intangibles are subject to
section 197,143 fifteen-year amortization appears to be accepted by
the government as the appropriate rule for most intangibles.
Indeed, a decade after section 197's enactment, the Treasury
Department established a fifteen-year safe harbor amortization
period for intangibles that do not fall within the scope of section
197 and that do not have readily ascertainable lives. 144
From a policy perspective, capitalizing and amortizing branding
expenditures-as opposed to expensing such costs all at once-
fulfills the government's goal of trying to match, for tax accounting
141 I.R.C. § 197(a). Although most self-created intangible assets are specifically excluded
from the rule, self-created trademarks and trade names are included. See id. § 197(c)(2),
(d)(1)(F) (including "any franchise, trademark, or trade name"); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-
2(b)(10)(d)(2) (as worded in 2011) (same); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 684 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1373 (stating that "the capitalized costs incurred in
connection with the development or registration of a trademark or trade name are to be
amortized over the 14-year period"). For purposes of section 197, a trademark includes "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted and used to identify
goods or services and distinguish them from those provided by others." Treas. Reg. § 1.197-
2(b)(10). A trade name includes "any name used to identify or designate a particular trade
or business or the name or title used by a person or organization engaged in a trade or
business." Id. A trademark or trade name includes "any trademark or trade name arising
under statute or applicable common law, and any similar right obtained by contract." Id.
142 See Gregory M. Beil, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy
Over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 733-34
(1995) (describing section 197 as a "simple solution" to the uncertainty of the prior regime).
For an argument that the fifteen-year period is too short, see Calvin H. Johnson, Extend the
Life for Acquired Intangibles to 75 Years, 135 TAX NOTES 1053, 1053-54 (2012).
143 For example, section 197 does not apply to any interest in a patent, patent application,
copyright, or computer software that is not acquired as part of a purchase of a trade or
business. I.R.C. §§ 197(e)(3)(A)(ii), (e)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(c)(7). The government has
chosen different tax depreciation rules for these separately acquired intellectual property
assets. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-4(a)-(b) (explaining treatment of computer software);
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752,
757 (2003) (defining computer software as property subject to section 197); JEFFREY A.
MAINE & XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: TRANSACTION AND
LITIGATION ISSUES 5-27 to 5-41 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining the types of intellectual property
covered under Section 197).
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(b).
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purposes, the cost of an asset to the income stream that the asset
produced. 145 Concededly, the pace of amortization chosen by the
government-fifteen years-is arbitrary. To achieve accurate tax
accounting, the pace of amortization would be the period of time
that the asset produces income in the taxpayer's business. 146 The
government, however, has historically abandoned the concept of
determinable useful life in calculating the proper annual
depreciation allowance to achieve goals other than sound
accounting practice. 147 Fifteen-year amortization appears to be an
accepted political compromise between a current deduction and no
deductions at all.
Fifteen-year amortization applies only to branding costs that
are chargeable to capital account and not otherwise currently
deductible. 148 This brings us back to the initial question of
whether branding costs should be capitalized in the first instance.
The "significant future benefit" approach adopted in INDOPCO
seemingly required the capitalization of branding expenditures, as
most branding expenditures give rise to long-term future benefits.
But since the Supreme Court's decision in 1992, there have been a
number of government responses and tax cases carving out
145 See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 104 (1960) ("It is the primary
purpose of depreciation accounting to further the integrity of periodic income statements by
making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use ... of the asset to the periods
to which it contributes.").
146 Id. at 106-07 (concluding that "useful life" must be tied to the time the business is
expected to use the asset, because such approach is "more likely to reflect correctly the
actual cost").
147 See Simon v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 41, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining the government's
abandonment of the useful life concept). It is also worth noting that in 1980, Congress
developed a set of arbitrary recovery periods for tangible assets used in business. See also
Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 207-19 (1981)
(detailing the various recovery periods). The pre-set recovery periods eliminated the need
for useful life and thus simplified the depreciation rules for tangible assets. See Simon, 68
F.3d at 45 (explaining that under the arbitrary recovery periods "the purpose served by the
determinable useful life requirement ... no longer exists"). These periods were usually
shorter than the useful life of the tangible assets, encouraging investment in such assets
and stimulating economic growth. See id. (explaining that the arbitrary recovery periods
allow recovery of the cost of an asset over a period usually shorter than the asset's useful
life, and that the accordingly simplified depreciation rules stimulated investment).
148 See I.R.C. § 197(b) ("Except as provided in subsection (a), no depreciation or
amortization deduction shall be allowable with respect to any amortizable Section 197
intangible."); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(a)(3).
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INDOPCO exceptions for, and permitting expensing of, certain
branding-related costs. 1 49 As noted in the sections below, current
tax rules now permit expensing of many brand advertisement
costs that produce long-term benefits; some brand advertisement
costs, however, remain subject to capitalization. Surprisingly, the
government has given little attention to the federal tax treatment
of brand enforcement expenditures, leaving us a handful of pre-
INDOPCO judicial opinions that have created seemingly
incoherent tax distinctions for such costs.
B. TAX LAW ON BRAND ADVERTISEMENT
Companies today devote significant financial resources to
advertise their brands. They utilize billboards along the highways
to reach motorists. They hire experts to create commercials for
broadcasting on television or airing via radio stations. They
purchase keywords from Google to ensure that searchers can reach
their websites with ease. They create multimedia programs and
apps to attract the attention of users to their brands. They rely on
traditional print media like newspapers and magazines to reach
particular segments of potential customers. They roll out major
advertisement campaigns to rejuvenate or remake their brands.
Overall, they employ all available tactics and means to advertise
their brands.
The tax treatment of costs associated with brand advertising
has developed over the years. Shortly after the Supreme Court's
INDOPCO decision, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued an
important administrative ruling impacting brand advertising
costs. In Revenue Ruling 92-80, the IRS ruled that INDOPCO
"would not affect the treatment of advertising costs as business
expenses which are generally deductible under section 162 of the
Code."150 The IRS carved out an important exception: "Only in the
149 See generally Jezabel Llorente, Nothing Left of INDOPCO: Let's Keep It That Way, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277 (2001).
150 Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, at *1 (1992). Current expensing of ordinary
advertising has been administratively sanctioned since the 1960s. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
20(a)(2) (allowing for expensing of expenditures for institutional or "good will" advertising);
Denise Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 528, 552-53 (1957), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds,
[Vol. 50:399434
2016] BRANDING TAXATION 435
unusual circumstance where advertising is directed towards
obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those traditionally
associated with ordinary [product, institutional,] or goodwill
advertising, must the costs ... be capitalized."'5 1
Branding is the process of "creating a unique name and image
for a product in the consumers' mind, mainly through advertising
campaigns with a consistent theme."'152 Advertising campaign
expenditures often create intellectual property rights in
trademarks and trade dress (the total image and overall
appearance of a product), 53 as such rights are based on use in
commerce; 54 campaign expenditures often encompass the costs of
creating copyrightable advertising materials as well.'55 An
interesting question is whether these long-term intellectual
property benefits should serve as the basis for requiring
capitalization of advertising campaign expenditures. In other
words, do advertising campaigns aim to obtain future benefits
beyond those traditionally associated with ordinary product,
institutional, or goodwill advertising, which would require costs
associated therewith to be capitalized under IRS guidelines?
The United States Tax Court addressed that question in a trade
dress and copyright development case decided six years after the
271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959) (holding that a political pamphlet advertisement was an
ordinary and necessary business expense).
151 Rev. Rul. 92-80, at *1 (emphasis added). The only example provided by the IRS was a
case involving an electric company's advertisement to allay public fears about nuclear
power. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 233 (1985)
(holding that advertising expenditures related to construction of nuclear plant were not
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses).
152 Branding, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.comldefinition/branding.
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (emphasis added).
153 See Trade Dress, INVL TRADEMARK ASS'N (Nov. 2015), http://www.inta.org/rrademark
Basics/FactSheets/Pages/Trade-Dress.aspx ("Trade dress is the overall commercial image
(look and feel) of a product that indicates or identifies the source of the product and
distinguishes it from those of others.").
154 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: ENHANCING
YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 6 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default
t/files/trademarks/hasics/BasicFacts.pdf (listing use in commerce as one possible basis for a
grant of intellectual property rights in trademarks).
155 See, e.g., Advertising Spending in the United States from 2011 to 2017, by Medium (in
Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/272315/advertising-spend
ing-in-the-US-by-medium/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (breaking down media spending on
copyrightable advertisements throughout the years).
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Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO and the IRS's issuance of
Revenue Ruling 92-80.156 In that case, the taxpayer incurred
substantial costs in developing an advertising campaign-namely
expenses related to the creation of graphic designs 157 and package
designs 158 for the packaging of its cigarette products-and sought
to deduct such campaign expenditures.1 59 The taxpayer also
sought to deduct the costs of executing the campaign. 160 Although
the government conceded that the advertising execution
expenditures were deductible, it argued that the advertising
campaign expenditures should be capitalized. 61 The government's
argument was that the campaign expenditures provided long-term
benefits that were not traditionally associated with ordinary
business advertising. 62 The graphic design and package design
costs provided legal rights and economic interests of a long-term
nature-the legal rights being the statutory rights and common-
law trademark rights that attach to "trade dress," and the
economic interests being the associated brand equity. 63  In
addition, the taxpayer received long-term copyright protection for
156 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). The United States Tax
Court is one of three courts that has original jurisdiction over tax cases. Courts of Original
Jurisdiction, CCH GROUP, https://www.cchgroup.com/media/wk/taa/pdfs/accounting-firms/
tax/understanding-judicial-systems-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). It is the only
forum in which a taxpayer may litigate a disputed tax claim without first having to pay the
asserted deficiency. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2012). While the Tax Court is based in Washington,
D.C., the court hears cases in several locations throughout the United States. See Places of
Trial, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/dpt-cities.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2016)
(listing the various places in which the court hears cases and listing its mailing address as
being in Washington D.C.).
157 "A 'graphic design'.., is a combination of verbal information, styles of print, pictures
or drawings, shapes, patterns, colors, spacing, and the like that make up an overall visual
display." RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. at 73. These designs "are developed for the following
components of a cigarette product:" cartons, packages, flags, tipping, foils, cigarette papers,
and closure seals. Id. at 74. They serve "to identify the product, convey information, and
attract attention at the point of sale when the retailer displays the pack." Id.
158 "The term 'package design' ... refers to the design of the physical construction of a
package." Id. at 73.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 80. Advertising execution expenditures were defined by the IRS as costs of
executing the advertising campaign (e.g., costs of production of television commercials). Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
'& Id. at 83.
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its copyrightable advertising materials. 164 The court rejected the
government's argument and held that graphic and package design
costs incurred by the taxpayer were not required to be capitalized
but were deductible as ordinary product advertising.l 65
The government's immediate response to the Tax Court's
treatment of advertising campaign expenditures was unsurprising.
In an Action on Decision, the IRS did not acquiesce to the court's
decision and announced that it would continue to litigate the
treatment of package design costs where appropriate.166 According
to the IRS, "Rev. Rul. 92-80 should not be read as a concession that
package design costs are advertising and, therefore, deductible."' 167
Citing an earlier ruling, the IRS concluded that "package design
164 Id. at 84.
165 Id. at 84-85. The court found that although the creation of graphic and package
designs may contribute to the future patronage or goodwill of the taxpayer's business,
Revenue Ruling 92-80 indicates that the costs are normally deductible. Id. at 82.
Essentially, the court concluded that both advertising campaign and advertising execution
expenditures account for at least some of the value of the typical trade dress, and since
advertising execution expenses are ordinary business expenses, "the long-term benefit
associated with trade dress is a benefit traditionally associated with ordinary business
advertising." Id. at 84. Therefore, the court held that all graphic design and package
design costs incurred by the taxpayer were not required to be capitalized but were
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. Id. at 84-85.
As for the government's argument that copyright protection afforded to copyrightable
advertising materials should serve as the basis for requiring the capitalization of
advertising expenses, the court disagreed, concluding that the copyright protection,
although long-term and for future business operation, was a traditional benefit associated
with ordinary business advertising. Id. at 84.
166 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998), action on dec., 1999-012, at
*2 (Oct. 4, 1999) ("We disagree with the opinion and do not acquiesce. We will continue to
litigate the treatment of package design costs where appropriate."). When the IRS loses a
Tax Court case, the IRS will usually either acquiesce or nonacquiesce in the decision. A
notice of acquiescence indicates that the IRS accepts the decision of the court, whereas a
notice of nonacquiescence indicates that the IRS may continue to challenge other taxpayers
with respect to the issue(s) presented in the case. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) 71 (1998), nonacq. 1999-2- C.B. XVI, at *1.
167 RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. 71, action on dec., 1998-012, at *1. For the IRS's position, see
Rev. Proc. 2002-9, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327 (§ 3.01) (deeming package design costs to be capital
expenditures under § 3, as opposed to mere advertising costs); Rev. Proc. 98-39, 1998-26
I.R.B. 36 (§ 2.03(2)) (noting that a package design may have an "ascertainable useful life
that extends substantially beyond the end of the tax year in which the costs are incurred");
Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-2 C.B. 448 (§ 3.04) (implying that package design costs are deductible
only in certain limited circumstances); Rev. RuL. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85 (holding that
package design costs are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses and
must be capitalized under § 263).
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costs are capital expenditures... hav[ing] an indeterminate useful
life," and are therefore distinguishable from advertising costs. 168
Five years later, however, in a major shift in tax policy, the
government reversed its position in a new set of regulations. In
January 2004, the Treasury issued final regulations that provide
comprehensive rules for capitalization of amounts paid to create or
acquire intangible assets. 16 9  Interestingly, the regulations
effectively repeal the "significant future benefit" standard of
INDOPCO and revive the "separate-and-distinct asset" test of
Lincoln Savings discussed above. 170 The reason given for using a
separate-and-distinct asset standard was that "[a] 'significant
future benefit' standard .. . does not provide the certainty and
clarity necessary for compliance with, and sound administration
of, the law."'7 1 The regulations identify categories of intangibles
for which capitalization is required, including "separate and
distinct intangible assets" created by the taxpayer. 172 However,
168 RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. 71, action on dec. 1998-012, at *1 (citing Davee v. United
States, 444 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Ala. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
635, at *30-31 (1969); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 223
(1985)).
169 See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (providing "rules for applying section 263(a) to amounts
paid to acquire or create intangibles").
170 See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
171 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg.
77,701, 77,702 (Dec. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
172 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i)-(iv). If an expenditure is not required to be
capitalized by the final regulations (or by another provision of the Code), the IRS will not
argue for capitalization on the ground that deduction of the expenditure does not clearly
reflect income. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 69 Fed.
Reg. 436, 437 (Jan. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (describing how the final
regulations interact with the "clear reflection of income" requirement of section 446(b)).
The regulations also require capitalization of amounts paid to "facilitate the ... creation of
an intangible ... if the amount[s are] paid in the process of investigating or otherwise
pursuing the transaction." Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(v)-4(e)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
But a taxpayer can elect to capitalize employee compensation, overhead, or de minimis
costs. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4)(iv). A taxpayer might capitalize such costs for financial
accounting purposes and prefer not to segregate such costs for federal income tax purposes.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 69 Fed. Reg. at 440.
The capitalization regulations adopt an exception termed the "12-month rule"
applicable to most self-created intangibles. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(O(1). Under the twelve-
month rule, a taxpayer is not required to capitalize amounts that provide benefits of a
relatively brief duration. Id. Specifically, the regulations provide:
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the regulations then limit application of the standard, specifically
providing that an amount paid to create a package design is not
treated as an amount that creates a separate and distinct
intangible asset. 73 Thus, under the final regulations, the costs of
creating a package design are deductible.
It should be noted that although a taxpayer can now expense
the costs of developing a package design, the taxpayer must
capitalize the costs of obtaining trademarks and copyrights on
elements of the package design (i.e., the fees paid to a government
agency to obtain trademark and copyright protection on certain
elements of the package design).1 74 For example, assume that a
taxpayer who manufactures and markets personal care products
pays a consultant $100,000 to develop a package design for the
company's newest product, Product A. Assume also that the
taxpayer pays a fee to a government agency to obtain trademark
and copyright protection on certain elements of the package design
and pays its outside legal counsel $10,000 for services rendered in
preparing the filing, prosecuting trademark and copyright
applications, and for other services rendered in securing the
trademark and copyright protection. The taxpayer is not required
to capitalize the $100,000 payment because amounts paid to
develop a package design are treated as amounts that do not
create a separate and distinct intangible asset. However, the
taxpayer must capitalize the amounts paid to the government
agency to obtain trademark and copyright protection. In addition,
A taxpayer is not required to capitalize... amounts paid to create ... any
right or benefit for the taxpayer that does not extend beyond the earlier
of-
(1) 12 months after the first date on which taxpayer realizes the right
or benefit; or
(2) The end of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the
payment is made.
Id.
173 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v) (describing the term package design as "the specific
graphic arrangement or design of shapes, colors, words, pictures, lettering, and other
elements on a given product, package, or the design of a container with respect to its shape
or function").
174 Id. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(5). This result (capitalization of costs of obtaining federal trademark
registrations) was the result under early case law. See, e.g., Deusenberg, Inc. Del. v.
Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 922, 924-26 (1934) (finding that the fees to register a trademark were a
capital expenditure), affd on other grounds, 84 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1936).
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the $10,000 paid by the taxpayer to its outside counsel is an
amount paid to facilitate the creation of the trademark and
copyright and must therefore be capitalized as well.175
Likewise, a taxpayer must capitalize the cost of tangible assets
associated with advertising. In Revenue Ruling 92-80 (the post-
INDOPCO ruling that confirmed the deductibility of ordinary
product advertising), the IRS ruled that "expenditures for
billboards, signs, and other tangible assets associated with
advertising remain subject to the usual rules with respect to
capitalization."176
In short, although capitalization is the norm in tax theory,
expensing is the reality when it comes to brand advertising
investments, 177 with the exception of trademark and copyright
registration fees and tangible assets associated with advertising.
This approach adopted by the government is critiqued later in this
Article.1 78
C. TAX LAW ON BRAND ENFORCEMENT
As part of brand enforcement, taxpayers resort to litigation
against infringing activities, e.g., the unauthorized use of the
taxpayer's trademark. 179  In trademark litigation, the owner
175 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(1), Example 9.
176 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 82 (1998), action on dec., 1999-012
(Oct. 4, 1999). Final Treasury Regulations issued in 2013 dealing with capitalization of
tangible assets confirm this result. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d)(1) (requiring capitalization of
amounts paid to produce or acquire a unit of real or personal property other than materials
and supplies). For an early case, see Best Lock Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1217, 1238 (1959)
("[Almounts paid ... to produce [a sale catalog] were capital items contributing to earning
income for several years in the future and not ordinary and necessary expenses of doing
business .... ).
177 Deductible advertising must meet requirements applicable to all business expenses.
See supra note 114 (noting the Code's allowance of deductions for "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses). Thus, deductible advertising must relate to an existing trade or
business (or expansion) and must be reasonable in amount, especially in relation to the
amount of the benefit expended. See, e.g., Menard, Inc. v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 229,
247 (2004) ("[To the extent the expenditures are reasonable in amount, the taxpayer may
deduct them as ordinary and necessary business expenses attributable to advertising."),
rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009); Schlafer v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH)
1374 (1990) (holding claimed deductions for sponsoring a race car were not reasonable).
178 See infra Part VI.
179 See, e.g., U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.D. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1188 (6th Cir.
1997) (arguing that defendant's use of the Archadeck trademark was unauthorized).
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desires to enjoin the illegal conduct and seeks compensatory
damages, defendant's profits, and in some instances, enhanced
damages and attorney's fees.18 0 In such litigation, the owner often
faces affirmative defenses, such as assertions that the trademark
at issue is invalid because it has become generic, is descriptive
without secondary meaning established, or has been abandoned
through naked licensing or extensive unauthorized use.181
Consequently, the owner will incur litigation costs, including the
costs to overcome those affirmative defenses threatening to cancel
or invalidate the property rights held by the owner.
There are no intellectual property-specific Code provisions
pertaining directly to brand enforcement legal costs. Thus, we
apply general tax principles discussed above: ordinary and
necessary business and investment expenses are currently
deductible while capital expenditures are not. The "norm" is
capitalization.18 2 With respect to litigation costs, courts generally
considered whether the taxpayer's primary purpose in initiating or
defending the litigation should be controlling, or whether the
outcome of the litigation should be a factor. It is now well settled
that the origin and character of the claim with respect to which
the costs of litigation are incurred is the controlling test. 183
Generally, to be currently deductible, litigation costs cannot
originate in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset.18 4 This
180 See id. at 1188 ("U.S. Structures prayed for an accounting, delivery of phone numbers
and other materials associated with the Archadeck name, damages, treble damages,
injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs.").
181 See, e.g., Barnes Grp. Inc. v. Connell Ltd. P'ship, 793 F. Supp. 1277, 1297, 1305 (D. Del.
1992) (arguing that the trademark became generic, a common descriptive feature, and had
been abandoned).
182 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) ("The notion that deductions are
exceptions to the norm of capitalization finds support in various aspects of the Code.").
IM. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963) (holding that "the origin and
character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred . .. is the controlling
basic test of... whether [the expense] is deductible"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 108360-10 (July
29, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1045005.pdf ("The controlling test to distinguish
business expenses from personal or capital expenditures is the 'origin of claim' test." (citing
Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1970)).
184 See Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 575-76 (1970) ("[C]osts incurred in the
acquisition of a capital asset are to be treated as capital expenditures."); United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 583 (1970) ("IT]he expenses of litigation that arise out of
the acquisition of a capital asset are capital expenses."); Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49-50 ("[1It
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is also known as the "origin-of-the-claim" test, a factually specific
inquiry wherein consideration must be given to "the issues
involved, the nature and objectives of the suit in which the
expenditures were made, the defenses asserted, the purpose for
which the claimed deductions were expended, the background of
the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the entire controversy." 185
The corollary to the origin-of-the-claim principle is that the cost of
defending or perfecting title to property is inherently a capital
expenditure.186 Thus, the tax treatment of litigation costs varies
depending on the nature of the litigation. To be immediately
deductible, litigation must not relate to title of property, but rather
to income from it. When litigation is conducted both to defend or
was manifestly Congress' purpose with respect to deductibility to place all income-
producing activities on an equal footing.").
185 Estate of Morgan v. Comm'r, 332 F.2d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1964), acq., 1966-2 C.B. 3.
The "origin-of-the-claim" test was originally created by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Gilmore and was used to determine whether litigation costs were incurred in a business
or profit-seeking context or whether the costs were personal. 372 U.S. 49. In Gilmore, the
taxpayer attempted to deduct a portion of the legal fees he paid in a divorce proceeding-
specifically, that portion attributable to his attorney's efforts to protect his ownership of
certain closely held stock (income-producing property) that his spouse had demanded in the
divorce. Id. at 41-42. The Court held that the divorce proceeding and the costs thereof
"stemmed entirely from the marital relationship" and were thus nondeductible personal
expenses. Id. at 51-52.
The origin-of-the-claim standard has also been used to determine whether litigation
costs-even if incurred in a business or profit-seeking activity-are nondeductible capital
expenditures. In Woodward v. Commissioner, taxpayers who owned a majority interest in a
corporation paid legal fees in an appraisal proceeding that arose in connection with the
required purchase of a dissenting minority shareholder's stock. 397 U.S. 572, 573-74
(1970). Relying on its decision in Gilmore, the Supreme Court held that the origin of the
claim that gave rise to the legal fees was the acquisition of stock and that the fees should
therefore be capitalized. Id. at 578-79.
186 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(d)(9)-4(e)(5), Example 6 (requiring capitalization of litigation
expenses incurred in defense of title to intangible property); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
199925012, 1999 WL 424839, at *3 (June 25, 1999) (citing former Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2);
Ca. & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235, 242 (Ct. Cl. 1962) ("[Tihe
Code and the regulations require that, before the expenditures can be deductible, they must
be... other than permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of
any property or estate, including expenditures incurred in defending or perfecting title to
property." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). The costs incurred in defending or
perfecting title to property are considered to be part of the cost of the property, and they
must be capitalized. Ca. & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp., 311 F.2d at 241-42. This rule is
functionally equivalent to the general rule requiring acquisition costs to be capitalized.
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perfect title (capital) and to preserve or collect income (deductible),
an allocation between the two categories is appropriate.1 87
Judicial precedents pertaining to the tax treatment of brand
enforcement legal costs are extremely limited. The well-settled
case relates to the tax treatment of legal costs of defending
trademark registrations in cancellation proceedings. In Georator
Corp. v. United States,'88 the taxpayer incurred litigation expenses
in defending its trademark registration in a cancellation
proceeding.'8 9 The ground for cancellation was that the taxpayer's
trademark had become the common name for certain types of
products; the cancellation proceeding was later dismissed because
of failure to present substantial evidence to refute the validity
presumption afforded the trademark at issue by virtue of its
registration.1 90 The Fourth Circuit first observed that federal
registration of a trademark confers several benefits upon the
holder of a trademark. The benefits, which are of long-term
duration, include: (1) constructive notice of ownership in the
trademark; (2) prima facie evidence of trademark validity,
registrant's ownership, and exclusive right to use the trademark in
commerce; (3) the possibility that the registration will become
incontestable after five years of continuous use and constitute
conclusive evidence of the registrant's right to use the trademark;
(4) the registrant's right to request customs officials to bar the
importation of goods bearing marks similar to the registered
trademark; and (5) registration effective for the initial period of
twenty years and possible subsequent renewal.' 19 Because the
benefits of federal registration are of indeterminate duration, the
costs of obtaining trademark registration must be capitalized.19 2
Because the costs of obtaining federal trademark registrations are
capital expenditures, the costs of litigation defending the federal
187 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) ("Attorneys' fees paid in a suit to quiet title to lands are not
deductible; but if the suit is also to collect accrued rents thereon, that portion of such fees is
deductible which is properly allocable to the services rendered in collecting such rents.").
MS 485 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973).
189 Id. at 284.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 285.
192 This is the result on current regulations discussed above. See supra notes 174-76 and
accompanying text.
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trademark registrations from cancellations are also capital
expenditures. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Georator noted that
"successful opposition to a cancellation proceeding secures the
benefits of registration as much as does the original registration of
the trademark."193
The less-settled case relates to the tax treatment of legal costs
incurred in trademark infringement actions. In trademark
infringement actions, trademark owners often seek damages as
well as an injunction restraining the defendant from using a
confusing mark. 94 Consequently, the question arises whether the
litigation relates to the recovery of lost income from the trademark
(in which cases costs are deductible) or to perfecting or preserving
rights to the trademark (in which case costs must be capitalized as
in Georator). In patent infringement cases, courts have held that
litigation costs are currently deductible. 195 The reason is that
patent infringement litigation is viewed as a "far cry from
removing a cloud of title, or defending ownership of property." 196
Rather, patent infringement cases are aimed at recovering a
taxpayer's lost profits. 197  Thus, legal costs in a patent
infringement action-for the purpose of protecting royalties
previously derived as well as those to be derived in the future-are
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses regardless
of whether the taxpayer is successful or unsuccessful in the
193 485 F.2d at 285.
194 See, e.g., Urquhart v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954) (seeking an injunction and
damages in trademark action).
195 See id. (finding litigation costs to be ordinary and necessary expenses).
19 Id. at 20. In patent infringement actions, the defense of invalidity of patent claims is
normally raised and disposed of first. But courts have held that litigation costs are
nevertheless deductible when the original claim was commonplace patent infringement. Id.
at 19.
197 Id. at 20 ("In patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is 'profits,' what the
owner of the patent loses by such infringement is 'damages.' And usually, although not
always, what a patent owner loses from infringement is the acquisition of 'a just and
deserved gain' from the exploitation of the invention embodied in his patent. Therefore an
award of damages in patent litigation is ordinarily an award of compensation for gains or
profits lost by the patent owner and hence is taxable to him as income in the year received."
(citations omitted) (quoting Mathey v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 259, 262 (1st Cir. 1949)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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infringement action.198 It appears legal costs in copyright
infringement actions receive the same tax treatment as legal costs
in patent infringement actions. 199
In contrast to patent and copyright infringement cases,
trademark infringement cases "are of peculiar pedigree."20 0 In two
cases, the Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit adopted similar
reasoning in requiring capitalization of attorney's fees and other
litigation costs in trademark infringement suits. In Danskin, Inc.
v. Commissioner,201 the Second Circuit analyzed the purpose and
effect of the legal expenses in the underlying trademark
infringement case. 20 2 Although the complaint for infringement
included a plea for damages, the Second Circuit observed that the
legal expenses increased the value of the taxpayer's trademark,
secured the property right of the taxpayer in the trademark, and
eliminated future infringement by the use of a similar
198 Id. at 20-21; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,490, 1980 WL 131296 (Aug. 27, 1980)
(stating that legal expenses associated with preventing patent infringement incurred by an
inventor who is in the business of inventing and licensing patents are deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162).
'9 See Saltzman v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1544, 1569 (1994) (holding that a portion of
the litigation costs in a copyright infringement action were to recover lost income and hence
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.
199925012, 1999 WL 424839, at *2 (June 25, 1999) (noting an apt comparison exists
between patents and copyrights in addressing "[w]hether costs incurred in the pursuit and
settlement of a copyright infringement action instituted by the Taxpayer may be deducted
as ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses or, instead, must be capitalized").
200 I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 199925012, at *3 (summarizing tax cases involving
trademark infringement costs).
201 331 F.2d 360, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), affg, 40 T.C. 318 (1963). For further discussion of the
deductibility of legal expenses in the context of intellectual property litigation, see I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 8831001 (Apr. 8, 1988); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8022002 (1980).
202 In Danskin, the taxpayer owned the federally registered DANSKIN trademark and
used the trademark in connection with manufacturing and marketing ladies' and children's
leotards, tights, and related items. Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 318, 319 (1963), aff'd,
331 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1964). In the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the taxpayer asserted a trademark infringement action against a competitor
for using the GAMSKIN trademark. Id. at 319-20. The court granted the taxpayer's
request for a temporary restraining order, and the parties later settled the litigation. Id. at
320. The defendant agreed to stop using the GAMSKIN trademark and to pay all court
costs and damages in the amount of $7,000 if it ever breached any provision of the
settlement. Id. The taxpayer incurred $4,666 in connection with the litigation and
subsequent settlement. Id. The taxpayer sought to deduct the costs as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162 of the Code. Id. The IRS disallowed the
claimed deductions, and the Tax Court sustained the IRS's determination. id. at 319-22.
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trademark. 2 3 Thus, the taxpayer enjoyed a financial gain that
would endure "for many years to come; and therefore the pattern
of the revenue laws of accurately matching income and expenses
within annual accounting periods requires that these legal
expenses be classified as capital outlays."204  According to the
court, the costs of removing the infringing threat to a trademark
resemble the costs of perfecting or preserving title to property.205
Such costs are well established as capital expenditures, not
currently deductible business expenses. 206 The Tenth Circuit, in
Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner,207 later relied in part upon
Danskin in holding that litigation costs incurred in a trademark
infringement action were not deductible expenses. 208
In at least one case, however, the Tax Court allowed the
deduction of legal costs incurred by a taxpayer who had a
trademark registration and unsuccessfully alleged trademark
infringement against a defendant. In J.R. Wood & Sons, Inc. v.
Commissioner,2 9 the IRS disallowed the taxpayer's claimed
deductions, arguing that the litigation was to defend or perfect
title to the taxpayer's trademark, as supported by the mere fact
that in the trademark litigation the defendant raised a defense of
trademark abandonment. 210 The Tax Court rejected the IRS's
argument as without support because the court in the trademark
infringement suit did not address the abandonment issue.211 The
Tax Court found that the taxpayer "did not seek to gain, protect or
improve title to any capital asset and, although the litigation was
unsuccessful, [the taxpayer] lost nothing of a capital nature in that
203 331 F.2d at 361.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975), affg 62 T.C. 509 (1974).
208 Id. at 139. For an earlier case than Danskin or Medco, see Food Fair of Va., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1089, 1089 (1950) (holding that litigation expenses incurred by the
taxpayer, who used the trade name "Food Fair" in connection with its retail grocery
business, in a suit against a competitor for using the same name were not deductible
because the suit was to defend the taxpayer's title or right in the trade name).
20- 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038 (Aug. 7, 1962).
210 Id. at *2.
211 Id.
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litigation."212 Accordingly, the litigation costs were incurred in the
ordinary conduct of the taxpayer's business in an effort to protect
its income and were thus allowable for deduction.
213
J.R. Wood is perhaps an isolated aberration of the Tax Court.
Indeed, the case was expressly questioned and rejected by the IRS
years later after the Danskin and Medco decisions.214 The purpose
of a trademark infringement action, even if it is unsuccessful, is to
secure benefits in the trademark, such as the exclusive right to use
the trademark in commerce. 215 Such benefits have a life beyond
the taxable year, as noted by the Second Circuit in Danskin and
the Tenth Circuit in Medco.216 Since there was no infringement of
the taxpayer's trademark in J.R. Wood, the taxpayer continued to
benefit from all the exclusive rights in the trademark.
In trademark litigation, the trademark owner often asserts both
trademark infringement and unfair competition claims.21 7 The
unfair competition claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
a very broad claim that encompasses a defendant's use of a
trademark or trade dress in commerce that causes a likelihood of
consumer confusion as to the source of the defendant's trademark
or trade dress and the plaintiffs trademark or trade dress. 218 Both
unfair competition claims and trademark infringement claims
reach the same likelihood-of-consumer confusion test; most courts
analyze the test and reach the same conclusion to both claims.
21 9
As such, monetary damages are available for both claims under
the Lanham Act. The question then becomes whether these claims
should be treated the same for tax purposes.
At least one case did not treat trademark and unfair
competition claims similarly for tax purposes and ruled that
litigation costs incurred in connection with an unfair competition
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38490, 1980 WL 131296, at *2 n.1 (Aug. 27, 1980); see also
I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 199925012, 1999 WL 424839, at *3 n.1 (June 25, 1999) ("Wood was
expressly questioned in [Gen. Couns. Mem.] 38490, and its result was rejected.").
215 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
216 Medco Products Co. v. Comm'r, 523 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir. 1975); Danskin, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 40 T.C. 318, 323 (1963).
217 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
218 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
219 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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claim were currently deductible. In Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United
States, the taxpayer-plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant
in federal court for trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 220 The defendant then filed an opposition proceeding
in the Patent and Trademark Office against the taxpayer-
plaintiffs trademark registration. 22' In the early stages of
litigation, the taxpayer-plaintiff commissioned a trademark
recognition survey for purposes of using the survey to demonstrate
that its trademark was valid.222 The taxpayer-plaintiff did not
have an opportunity to use the survey, because the litigation was
settled and the opposition proceeding was terminated. 223 But the
taxpayer-plaintiff later used the trademark recognition survey for
its advertising purposes. 224
The taxpayer sought to deduct its legal costs, as well as the
costs of the trademark recognition survey.225 Strangely, the court
divided the litigation expenses equally between the unfair
competition and trademark infringement claims. 226 The court
observed that the trademark infringement claim sought judicial
determination that the plaintiff had a property right in the
trademark, while the unfair competition claim sought money
damages for the alleged unfair competition. 227  Accordingly,
litigation expenses associated with the trademark infringement
claim were not deductible because they were incurred for the
purpose of protecting or perfecting title in property. 228 Expenses
associated with the unfair competition claim, however, were
deductible. 229
In addition, the court divided the survey costs "equally between
those properly deductible and those not so deductible. '" 230 The
court found that the consumer recognition survey was conducted
220 280 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. I. 1967).
221 Id. at 798.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 796.
226 Id. at 801.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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for contemplated use of supporting both the trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims. 231 Accordingly, half of
the survey costs would be deductible, as such costs contributed to
the unfair competition claim. 232 The other half would be treated as
capital expenditures and not deductible in the year incurred.
233
The taxpayer unsuccessfully attempted to have the total costs of
the consumer recognition survey deducted as costs for advertising
purposes. 234 Though the taxpayer-plaintiff indeed used the survey
results for advertising purposes, such use was subsequent to the
settlement of the litigation, which occurred at an early stage. 23 5
The court thus determined that such use could "hardly be given
retroactive significance as the primary purpose for which [the
surveys] were secured. 236
VI. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS
A business must both use a trademark in commerce and defend
it if necessary, or risk losing it under intellectual property laws.237
As described in Part V, the federal income tax treatment of use
(advertising costs) and enforcement (litigation costs) varies
greatly. Advertising dollars spent to build up the goodwill value of
a trademark are expensed (with the exception of the costs of
tangible assets associated with advertising). 238  In contrast,
litigation costs incurred to protect that enhancement of value must
be capitalized (with the exception of legal costs in unfair
competition claims).239  These tax distinctions for branding
2.31 Id. at 797, 801.
232 Id. at 801.
233 Id. at 801-02.
234 Id. Recall from above that ordinary product and institutional goodwill advertising costs
are deductible under section 162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
2:35 Id. at 796-97.
236 Id. at 801.
2"37 See Loss of Trademark Rights, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N (May 2015), http://www.inta.
org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/PagesfLossoffrademarkRightsFactSheet.aspx ("The most
common way to lose rights in a mark is to stop using the mark with no intention to use it
again .... Trademark rights may also be lost when... the owner does little or nothing to
police its mark, [as] the mark is likely to lose some or all of its value as a source identifier in
the marketplace.").
238 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
239 See supra Part V.C.
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activities raise important policy questions. If these tax
distinctions lack theoretical justification, legislative or
administrative changes may be warranted.
A. IDENTIFYING AN APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR BRAND
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
Regarding the deductibility of business and investment
expenses, the "norm" is capitalization and therefore
depreciation/amortization. 240 As described in Part V, however,
wide exemptions from normative capitalization have been
established for brand development expenditures. Under current
law, costs of usual brand advertising are currently deductible. 241
This includes, for example, the costs of using social media,
maintaining a website, purchasing keywords, embedding keywords
in a website, placing an ad in the newspaper, bundling inserts of
ad pages with newspapers, distributing flyers, and sending logos
in e-mails. In addition, the costs of unusual brand advertising are
currently deductible. 242 This includes, for example, advertising
campaign costs and graphic and package design costs. 243 The
favorable treatment of advertising suggests that the government
views advertising expenses as part of a "normal" income tax
system; indeed, "neither the Joint Committee on Taxation nor the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) treats advertising
deductions as a 'tax expenditure'" for the government. 24
In stark contrast to the current tax regime (expensing),
arguments could be made for the uniform capitalization of all
advertising costs. 245  It could be argued, for instance, that
advertising-campaigns and executions-should not be viewed as
240 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
241 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 169-77.
243 See supra notes 169-77.
244 Annette Nellen, Advertising Expense and Tax Reform: How Not to Broaden the Tax
Base, AICPA (July 31, 2014), http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCERCONTE
NT/Newsletters/Articles_2014/CorpTax/BroadenTaxBase.jsp.
245 See Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX
REV. 347, 444 (2000) (questioning the tax deduction for advertising on the basis of public
welfare concerns); Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229,
2266-67 (2014) (arguing that tax law should require capitalization of investments in self-
created intellectual capital, including branding).
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part of a "normal" income tax system; rather, advertising is an
unusual cost that invariably produces unique, long-term benefits,
which, alone, justifies capitalization. Advertising campaign
expenditures typically result in statutory and common law
trademark rights that attach to trade dress, copyright protections,
and economic interests associated with brand equity.246 These
intangible benefits are not realized in the current year alone, but
endure over the economic life of the brands. As with advertising
campaign expenditures, advertising execution expenditures often
provide benefits that endure for many years.247 For example, a
communication to the general public for the purpose of promoting
a business or its products-whether in the form of website display,
multimedia program, video segments to go viral on YouTube, e-
mail communication, radio broadcast, or newspaper publication-
has the potential to yield benefits for the business that extend
beyond the current year, as a memorable communication,
transmitted only once, may have a lingering impact on a particular
consumer. Case law has recognized the similar benefits produced
by both campaign and execution expenditures to justify similar tax
treatment, i.e., current deduction for both.248 But these similar
benefits are of a long-term nature, justifying a different outcome,
i.e., capitalization for both.
The uniform capitalization of advertising costs would broaden
the tax base and raise necessary revenue for the government in a
climate of serious budget deficits. Legislative proposals have been
made to restrict the tax deduction for advertising. Most recently,
in 2014, Representative David Camp introduced legislation that
would require large businesses to capitalize most advertising
expenses and then amortize such expenses over ten years.249 A
246 RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 82 (1998).
247 Id. at 84.
248 See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
249 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/ll3[hrl. Camp's proposal, which would be phased-in until 2018, would add Section
177 to the Code and allow an immediate tax deduction for advertising expenses in any
taxable year that do not exceed $1 million. Id. § 3110(b) (providing that the exemption is
phased out for otherwise deductible advertising expenses in any year exceeding $1.5
million). Then, fifty percent of "specified advertising expenses" would be charged to a
capital account and allowed an amortization deduction ratably over the ten-year period,
beginning with the midpoint of the taxable year in which such expenses are paid or
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similar bill was proposed in 2013 by Senator Max Baucus that
would have required advertisers to deduct only fifty percent of all
advertising expenses and amortize the remainder over the next
five years.250 These proposals, which would raise revenue without
raising income tax rates, have been criticized and do not appear to
be gaining support.251  Critics contend that capitalization is
unwarranted and "would deny businesses the ability to deduct
their expenses and thus overstate their taxable income"; indeed, it
was suggested that Camp's proposal "would increase business
taxes by $169 billion over ten years."252 The advertising industry,
particularly, the Association of National Advertising, has criticized
any legislation, arguing that such action would have a profound
impact on both the advertising industry and the economy more
broadly by increasing the cost of advertising and causing a
"substantial disincentive for companies to spend additional
advertising dollars."253  According to the advertising industry,
advertising drives sales and jobs, stimulates new economic
activity, and in 2012, it accounted for $5.6 trillion of U.S. output
and supported 21.1 million-nearly 16%-of the 136.2 million U.S.
jobs. 254  It was estimated that if Camp's proposal were
incurred. Id. "Specified advertising expenses" include advertising expenses paid or
incurred for the development, production, or placement of any communication to the general
public which is intended to promote the taxpayer or a trade or business; specified
advertising expenses do not include discounts or coupons, creation of logos, trade names,
package design, or market research. Id. § 31 10(d)(2).
250 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE CHAIRMAN'S STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT TO REFORM CERTAIN BUSINESS PROVISIONS
46 (JCX-19-13) (Comm. Point 2013), http://www.finance.senate.gov (click search tool at top
right corner; search "Final SFC Business TE 11-19-13"); see also Press Release, Sen. Comm.
on Fin., Baucus Works to Overhaul Outdated Tax Code (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.finan
ce.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=536eefeb-2ae2-453f-af96-946c3O5d5c93.
251 See, e.g., Nellen, supra note 244 (critiquing Rep. Camp's proposal based on its
complexity, predictability, accounting principles, economic efficiency, and competitiveness).
But see Kahng, supra note 245, at 2275 ("[1Rlecent legislative proposals of 50% seem
reasonable in view of empirical estimates.").
252 Curtis S. Dubay & David R. Burton, Chairman Camp's Tax Reform Plan Keeps Debate
Alive Despite Flaws, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/researchlre
ports/2014/03/chairman-camps-tax-reform-plan-keeps-debate-alive-despite-flaws.
253 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Potential Changes in Deductibility of
Advertising Expenses Within Tax Reform Legislation Would Only Serve to Stifle Economic
Activity (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ana.net/contentishow/id/28593.
254 Id.
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implemented, "more than 1.7 million jobs and $456 billion in sales
would be jeopardized."255  The advertising industry, however, is
not the only group to show the persuasive forces of advertising. 256
In a recent non-industry sponsored study, the Centre for Economic
Performance studied the effect of advertising expenditures of firms
and consumer prices across industries and found that advertising
tends to lower consumer prices across the board. 257
Criticism of legislative proposals to change the current
advertising deduction illustrates the difficulty policymakers would
have in moving toward a uniform capitalization rule for all
advertising costs. As noted by Professor Johnson, a strong
proponent of capitalization in general,
[E]xpensing of various investments has crept into the
income tax system over the years .... Part of it is a
"tragedy of the commons" in politics, under which the
special exemptions systematically triumph over the
common good. The public cannot be organized to
protect the general welfare because the interest of
each member of the public in a fair and uniform tax
255 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Advertising Deduction Wrongly Targeted in
Chairman Camp's Proposed Tax Reform Legislation; Provision Would Stifle Economic
Activity (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/29628.
25 See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law,
38 N.M. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008) ("Courts also accepted that advertising played a positive role in
the national economy."); Jerrold L. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State: II, 42 TEX. L.
REV. 603, 614-16 (1964) ("Advertising expenditures in this country have constantly
escalated over the last decade, and it is now confidently predicted that they will attain the
phenomenal annual total of 25 billion dollars ten years hence. This fact is indicative of the
indispensable role played by advertising in conjunction with mass communication media in
the economy of the positive state.").
257 Ferdinand Rauch, Advertising Expenditure and Consumer Prices, CTR. FOR ECON.
PERFORMANCE (Aug. 2011), http://cep.lse.ac.uklpubs/downloaddplO93.pdf; see also Brad
Plumer, Does Advertising Help or Harm the Economy?, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2012/11/27/does-advertising-help-or-harm-the
-economy/ (discussing the Centre's findings). For a study conducted by Global Insight, Inc.,
an economics organization, see IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES 2012-2017, https://www.ana.net/getfile/
20391.
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system is too low, and the interest of those seeking a
special exemption is so intense. 258
But it has been argued that the current advertising deduction
has never been a tax preference item, 'loophole' or
special interest benefit. Rather, it provides an
opportunity for every company in every industry
throughout the U.S. to communicate efficiently with
consumers about products and services.... [They]
always have been.., treated no differently than any
other ordinary and necessary business expense. 259
In sum, while uniform capitalization for all advertising would
contribute to a sound tax base, it would increase the cost of
advertising for firms and perhaps be too hard for businesses to
accept and policymakers to defend.
Although capitalization is the norm in our income tax system,
in practice it is not. In numerous instances, the government has
justified exemptions that deliberately drive economic
decisionmaking. For example, to encourage research activity and
to stimulate economic growth and technological development,
Congress permits taxpayers to expense research and development
expenditures that might otherwise have to be capitalized. 260 As a
258 Calvin H. Johnson, Omnibus Capitalization Proposals, 124 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122
(2009).
259 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, supra note 255.
260 See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2012) (allowing taxpayers to treat research and experimental
expenditures as expenses not chargeable to capital account); id. § 263(a)(1)(B) (providing
that the capitalization rules under section 263(a) do not apply to research and experimental
expenditures deductible under section 174(a)). For the statute's legislative history, see H.R.
REP. No. 1337, at 4262-64 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4053; 100 CONG.
REc. 3,425 (1954) (statement of Chairman Reed: "This provision will greatly stimulate the
search for new products and new inventions upon which the future economic and military
strength of our Nation depends. It will be particularly valuable to small and growing
businesses."). See also Donald C. Alexander, Research and Experimental Expenditures
Under the 1954 Code, 10 TAx L. REV. 549, 549 (1955) (noting a primary reason for enacting
section 174 was to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal
subsidy of research and development start-ups); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for
Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 349 (1987)
(explaining that Congress decided to provide taxpayers with the option of an immediate
deduction in order to encourage new research and development); Richard L. Parker, The
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further example, to encourage investment in productive,
depreciable, tangible personal property and to encourage economic
activity, Congress allows taxpayers to immediately expense the
acquisition cost of such property, subject to certain limitations.261
The relevant inquiry here is whether the law's current exemptions
for both usual advertising (ordinary product, institutional, or
goodwill advertising) and unusual advertising (advertising
campaigns) are sound. We argue below that, when evaluated
under normative tax policy criteria, expensing makes sense for the
former category, but capitalization should apply for the latter.
1. Expensing Usual Advertising Expenditures. Tax law's
current treatment (expensing) of ordinary brand advertising
serves legitimate goals. Most notably, advertising stimulates
economic growth and thus produces positive externalities. In a
recent study analyzing the total economic impact of advertising
expenditures across sixteen industries and the government,
researchers determined that each dollar spent on advertising
expenses generates nearly $22 of economic output that would not
have otherwise existed.262 Additionally, every $1 million spent on
annual advertising expenses supports eighty-one American jobs.263
The study projected that "[bly 2017, advertising will directly and
indirectly foster $6.5 trillion in U.S. economic activity (sales) and
help support 22.1 million U.S. jobs."264 Thus, while it is important
to the economy to stimulate the search for new products and new
inventions, it is equally important to support the dissemination of
Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start-
Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV. 625, 694 (1990) ("The deduction election under section 174(a)
is intended to encourage research and development activities by allowing the cost of such
activities to be used to offset the income earned in the business at the earliest possible
date.").
261 See I.R.C. § 179(a) (allowing taxpayers to elect to write off the cost of acquisition of
"section 179 property" as an expense "not chargeable to capital account'). Section 179
property is tangible property or off-the-shelf computer software, which is personal property
and is purchased for the active conduct of a trade or business. Id. § 179(d)(1). There are
limits on the amount that can be expensed in any given year. Id. § 179(b).
262 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, New Study Underscores Advertising's Role as
a Critical Driver of the U.S. Economy (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.ana.netcontent/show/
id/29212. Economists and other research groups have also studied the persuasive effects of
advertising. See Rauch, supra note 257; IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, INC., supra note 257.
263 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, supra note 262.
264 Id.
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those products through marketing. 265 If policymakers wish not to
subsidize the marketing of "bad" products (e.g., alcohol or tobacco
products) out of social welfare concerns, then special capitalization
rules could be carved out for advertising investments associated
with those products.266
Current expensing of usual advertising costs furthers
administrative efficiency. 267 In contrast, a capitalization rule for
such costs would necessarily add complexity to the current tax
system. For example, a default capitalization rule for advertising
would have to define "advertising" to avoid ambiguities and
provide clarity of tax result, a seemingly impossible task. 268
Advertising would surely include fees paid to an outside marketing
firm. But would advertising include salaries paid to employees in
a company's marketing or public relations department, which
otherwise are expensed under current law? Would advertising
include wages paid to in-house counsel or fees to outside counsel to
265 But see Kahng, supra note 245, at 2266 ("[I]t is hard to justify a deduction for
advertising to promote a brand on the grounds that it provides socially valuable spillover
effects.").
266 See Hymel, supra note 245, at 444-61 (noting such past legislative and scholarly
proposals to amend the advertising tax deduction).
267 Expensing is sometimes used by the government to eliminate uncertainties caused by
the capitalization principle. Section 174, for example, allows taxpayers to elect to
immediately deduct qualified research and development expenditures that would otherwise
be capitalized. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. While the primary justification
for the special deduction was to encourage new research and development activity and
stimulate economic growth and technological development, as noted supra note 260,
another justification was to reduce uncertainties caused by applying the asset capitalization
rules to research and development activities. See David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of
Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 85, 88-89 (1991) (discussing the problems
associated with the capitalization rules); George Mundstock, Taxation of Business
Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179, 1258-59 (1987) ("Besides reducing uncertainty,
section 174 was intended to encourage R&D and to ensure that start-up businesses can
deduct R&D that would be deductible by an ongoing concern.").
268 The current capitalization rules for costs of improvements to tangible property has
been plagued by similar problems. For instance, the costs of improvements (as opposed to
repairs) to property must be capitalized. I.R.C. § 263(a) (2012). But what is an
improvement? Although the regulations under section 263 have existed for some time, they
have long been considered vague, subjective, and the source of much litigation. See, e.g.,
Otis v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 671, 674-75 (1980) (holding that the replacement of carpets,
draperies, refrigerators, and dishwashers "was more than mere incidental repair" and
would thus need to be capitalized). As a result, the Treasury has recently issued new
regulations expanding and clarifying the rules surrounding improvements. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-1, -2, -3 (2014).
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ensure compliance with advertising laws? 269 If the government
excluded employee compensation from the definition of advertising
to resolve controversies and eliminate the burden on taxpayers of
allocating transaction costs, 270 inequities would emerge. Large
firms with in-house marketing staff and legal staff handling
advertising matters would be permitted to deduct compensation
related to advertising, whereas small firms that have to pay
outside marketing firms and consultants to perform functions
related to advertising would be required to capitalize such
expenses.
A capitalization rule for usual brand advertising would also
necessarily contain various limitations and exceptions difficult for
taxpayers to apply and for the government to administer. As an
example, a default capitalization rule would most likely contain an
exception for usual brand advertising that produced only short-
term benefits (say twelve months or less), which would lead to
controversies between taxpayers and the government over the
duration of benefits. 271 Assume a business pays a fee to a radio
269 Professor Nellen raised these excellent points in her criticism of Rep. David Camp's
proposal to capitalize advertising expenses. Nellen, supra note 244.
270 Under current law, there is an assumption that employee compensation and overhead
costs do not facilitate the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of an intangible asset,
regardless of the percentage of time that is allocable to capital transactions. See Guidelines
for Intangibles Under IRC § 263(a), IRS (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/gui
delines-for-intangibles-under-irc-section-263-a ("[U]ntil further guidance is finalized,
capitalization will not be asserted under § 263(a) for employee compensation .. , fixed
overhead, or de minimus costs related to the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of
intangible assets or benefits."). Employee compensation, which is not subject to
capitalization under the simplifying convention, includes salary, bonuses, and commissions
paid to an employee of the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4)(ii). The employee
simplifying convention is extended to amounts paid to so-called independent contractors
and outside contractors for secretarial, clerical, and similar administrative services. Id.
271 Such an exception exists in current regulations governing the capitalization of certain
intangible assets. Under the so-called "12-month rule," applicable to most self-created
intangibles, a taxpayer is not required to capitalize amounts that provide benefits of a
relatively brief duration. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(f)(l)(i)-(ii). Specifically, the regulations
provide that a taxpayer is not required to capitalize amounts paid to create any right or
benefit for the taxpayer that does not extend beyond the earlier of: (1) twelve months after
the taxpayer first realizes the right or benefit; or (2) the end of the taxable year that follows
the taxable year in which the payment is made. Id. The purpose of the twelve-month rule
was to reduce the administrative and compliance costs inherent in applying section 263(a)
to amounts paid to create intangible assets. Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,701, 77,708 (Dec. 19, 2002) (to be codified at
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station to play a jingle on the radio during November of Year One,
but potential consumers continue to sing the jingle while
showering and driving in their cars throughout Years Two and
Three. Would the fee fall within the short-term-benefits
exemption and be expensed because the contract with the radio
station was for one month, or would the fee be capitalized under
the default rule because the advertising investment really didn't
expire by the end of Year One? Expensing, rather than
capitalization, of usual advertising would avoid the need to make
determinations like this and provide certainty and clarity to
minimize costs of compliance and administration.
In addition to the economic and administrative efficiencies
achieved under the current system (via tax expensing of ordinary
brand advertising), expensing ordinary product advertising also
creates an even playing field between (1) businesses that spend
money to advertise and build up the goodwill value in their own
trademarks and (2) businesses that choose, instead, to license from
others the right to use well-known trademarks in connection with
the products they manufacture and sell. While expensing of the
former has long been allowed, the deductibility of the latter (sales-
based royalty payments) has been the subject of litigation and
regulation. It is now settled that if a taxpayer obtains a license to
use well-known trademarks in connection with certain products
manufactured and distributed by the taxpayer and agrees to pay
royalties to the licensor based on a percentage of net sales of the
products bearing the licensor's trademarks, the royalty payments
can be expensed, rather than capitalized, to the products
produced. 272 Treating equally those taxpayers who spend money to
26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The rule is easily applied with respect to pre-paid expenses and contract
rights. Such a rule might prove more difficult to apply with respect to benefits of usual
advertising, the duration of which is not easily determined.
272 The IRS's initial position on the deductibility of sales-based trademark royalties was
tested in Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. Conm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1037, T.C. Mem. 2009-9
(Jan. 14, 2009), rev'd, 600 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010). The taxpayer, a kitchen tool
manufacturing company, licensed the rights to use well-known trademarks in connection
with some of the kitchen tools it produced and sold, agreeing to pay royalties to licensors
based on a percentage of net sales of the tools bearing the licensors' trademarks. Robinson
Knife, 600 F.3d at 123. The taxpayer deducted the royalty payments as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. Id. at 124. The IRS determined that the royalties paid
should be capitalized as indirect costs allocable to products (kitchen tools) produced. Id.
458 [Vol. 50:399
2016] BRANDING TAXATION 459
build up the value of their own marks and those taxpayers who
spend money to license already-valuable marks achieves
fairness-an important goal of tax policy. 273
Although expensing is permitted for usual brand advertising,
there is an important exception. A taxpayer must capitalize the
cost of tangible assets associated with advertising; specifically,
"expenditures for billboards, signs, and other tangible assets
associated with advertising remain subject to the usual rules with
respect to capitalization."274 By creating a tax distinction between
the cost of intangibles associated with brand advertising
(expensed) and the cost of tangible assets associated with brand
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the taxpayer. Id. at 122-23. Although the Second
Circuit rejected the taxpayer's argument that the royalty payments were deductible as
marketing, selling, advertising, or distribution costs, it was persuaded by the taxpayer's
argument that the royalty payments were not "properly allocable to property produced"
within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-l(e): "We hold that where, as here, a producer's
royalty payments (1) are calculated as a percentage of sales revenue from inventory and (2)
are incurred only upon the sale of that inventory, they are immediately deductible as a
matter of law because they are not 'properly allocable to property produced.'" Robinson
Knife, 600 F.3d at 122-23. After the Second Circuit's decision in Robinson Knife, the
Treasury Department issued proposed regulations on sales-based royalties. Sales-Based
Royalties and Vendor Allowances, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,940, 78,940-44 (Dec. 17, 2010) (to he
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The proposed regulations provide a taxpayer-favorable result
similar to that reached by the Second Circuit. Technically, the proposed regulations provide
that sales-based royalties may be capitalizable to property produced by a taxpayer. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-l(e)(3)(i)(A), 75 Fed. Reg. 78,940, 78,943 (Dec. 17, 2010). The proposed
regulations also provide a broad relief provision that such royalties required to be
capitalized are allocable only to costs of goods sold (and not ending inventory). Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(U)(2), 75 Fed. Reg. 78,940, 78,943 (Dec. 17, 2010). So, although the
regulations do not say that sales-based royalty costs are inherently non-capitalizable, they
do provide that otherwise capitalizable sales-based royalties are properly allocable to
property sold during the year. In short, the proposed regulations achieve a similar result to
that produced in Robinson Knife. Most taxpayers will not have to capitalize their sales-
based royalties into ending inventory.
273 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual
Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2010) ("[Tlax fairness.., is usually described
in terms of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity requires that persons who are similarly
situated should be taxed in a similar fashion. A related concept of equity is that
economically equivalent activities should be taxed in the same manner even if they differ in
form. Horizontal equity was once considered the primary goal of tax policy, and even if no
longer held in quite this same regard, it nonetheless remains an important principle of tax
theory.").
274 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 83 (1995). Final Treasury
Regulations issued in 2013 dealing with the capitalization of tangible assets confirm this
result. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d)(1).
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advertising (capitalized), tax considerations potentially distort a
taxpayer's brand strategy. Tax rules should embrace the principle
of efficiency and minimize the social costs of taxation. 275
Specifically, tax rules for branding expenditures should be
neutral-they should not interfere with a taxpayer's economic
behavior and should avoid deadweight losses caused by
restructuring of branding activities to minimize taxes. 276 Over the
past half century, the principle of neutrality has lost ground to
what might be termed "social engineering," and there now exist
many tax rules in place that deliberately attempt to drive
economic decisionmaking. 277 It is questionable, however, whether
neutrality violations in the branding context represent sound tax
policy. For example, why should a business be permitted to deduct
the cost of Facebook advertising or television advertising, but not
the cost of an advertising sign or billboard? Does the former
achieve a more important social engineering policy or advance the
public interest more so than the latter? Such a tax distinction is
also difficult to reconcile because intellectual property produced
275 "[A] criterion of sound tax policy-efficiency-has been measured by contradictory
standards and means various things in various contexts." Nguyen & Maine, supra note
273, at 5. Efficiency can be viewed as a utilitarian concept that seeks a balance between
maximizing tax revenues and minimizing the social costs of taxation. See Herman P.
Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic Concept or Budgetary Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES
1152, 1153 (2001) (describing tax policies that "spend[ ] much less on a per capita basis" as
sufficient); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 978-1012 (1986) (describing the impact of tax incentives
under different definitions of efficiency); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform
Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 63 (1996) (describing three forms of taxes that create
distortions and stating that "[eifficient taxes distort as little as possible").
276 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 29 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that efficiency requires that a tax
interfere as little as possible with people's economic behavior); David Elkins, Horizontal
Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 43, 47 (2006) (stating that
efficient taxes minimize deadweight losses caused by taxpayer actions to reduce tax
burdens by choosing courses of action that minimize tax).
277 Many of the special tax provisions governing patents and copyrights, for example, were
a deliberate attempt to support the social-utility mandate of patent and copyright laws.
Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property Taxation:
Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 831
(2011). Tax expenditures in the form of deductions and credit for certain research and
development, and short write-off periods for certain intellectual property acquisitions, were
deliberately designed to drive economic decisionmaking to achieve more important
intellectual property social policies. Id. at 831-33.
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from ordinary brand advertising (copyrights, trade dress,
trademarks) generally depends on tangible forms for their creative
existence.
2. Capitalizing Unusual Advertising Expenditures. Although
sound policy arguments can be made for expensing ordinary brand
advertising expenditures, arguments can be made for capitalizing
advertising campaign expenditures (specifically, costs of graphic
designs and package designs). Historically, advertising campaign
costs were charged to capital accounts, but as a result of a
significant, unexplained change in tax policy in 2004, they are now
expensed. 278 We believe this policy shift was inappropriate and
that no circumstances justify divergence from the norm when it
comes to campaign costs. 27 9 We argue below that ordinary brand
advertising expenses should be equated with deductible repairs to
tangible property, whereas advertising campaign expenditures
should be equated with capitalized improvements to tangible
property. Such a standard would be superior to historic standards
that were used in distinguishing between deductible and
nondeductible advertising.
Much of the historic uncertainty over the proper tax treatment
of package design costs resulted from a lack of clarity over the
proper standard to apply. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings &
Loan Ass'n, the Supreme Court concluded that an expenditure
that serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset must
be capitalized. 280 Later in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, the
Supreme Court minimized the importance of the separate-and-
278 See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. Before final regulations were issued
in 2004, the IRS took the position that the costs of creating a package design must be
capitalized, because package designs do not have ascertainable useful lives. Rev. Proc.
2002-9, 2002-3 C.B. 327 (§ 3.01); Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-2 C.B. 448 (§ 5); Rev. Rul. 89-23,
1989-1 C.B. 85 (1989).
279 Professor Johnson has argued for the capitalization of package design costs. See
Johnson, supra note 258, at 1127 ("Package design costs are not meritorious enough to be
subsidized by the tax system by way of expensing or with an artificially short life.").
Professor Johnson states that product design costs are capitalized, and that "no viable
distinction can be made between good design for the product being sold and good design for
the package it comes in." Id. We do not understand Professor Johnson's rationale, as
product design costs may be expensed under section 174 of the Code. Nevertheless, we
agree with his conclusion and adopt an alternative rationale for capitalization.
280 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971); see also supra notes 122-23.
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distinct-asset test of Lincoln Savings and adopted a broad future
benefits standard for capitalization. 28 1  But, final regulations
providing comprehensive rules for capitalization of intangibles
effectively repealed the significant future benefits standard of
INDOPCO and revived the separate-and-distinct asset test of
Lincoln Savings.28 2
The current intangibles regulations allow package design costs
to be expensed rather than capitalized; specifically, they provide
that a package design is not a separate and distinct asset, the cost
of which must be capitalized. 283 The regulation adopted the result
in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner.2 4 In RJR Nabisco, an
important trade dress and copyright development case, the Tax
Court did not accept that there existed a distinction between the
benefits of advertising campaign expenditures and advertising
execution expenditures to justify differing tax treatment. 28 5 The
government argued that advertising campaign expenditures
provide long-term benefits, whereas advertising execution
expenditures give rise to short-term benefits; thus, the former
should be capitalized, while the latter may be expensed. 28 6 But the
court did not accept the long-term, short-term distinction and
instead found that trade dress is a product of both advertising
campaign and execution expenditures. 28 7  The court then
concluded that the long-term benefit associated with trade dress
must be a benefit traditionally associated with ordinary business
advertising and cannot serve as a basis to require capitalization of
advertising campaign expenditures. 288
The court's reasoning in RJR Nabisco is fundamentally flawed.
It is indeed strange to conclude that advertising campaign
expenditures (which historically have been charged to capital
accounts) should be expensed on the basis that advertising
execution expenditures (which historically have been deductible)
281 503 U.S. 79, 86-90; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
283 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v).
284 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998).
285 Id. at 84-85.
286 Id. at 83.
287 Id. at 84.
288 Id.
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produce some of the same benefits as the campaign expenditures.
This would be tantamount to arguing that the cost of replacing a
leaking roof should be expensed on the basis that a repair of some
shingles on the roof (appropriately expensed under current law)
would produce the same benefit-fixing the leak.
Neither standard-the future benefits approach under
INDOPCO or the separate-and-distinct asset test in Lincoln
Savings and the current intangibles regulations-truly provides
the certainty and clarity necessary for distinguishing between
deductible and non-deductible advertising expenditures. As noted
in RJR Nabisco, both advertising campaign expenditures and
advertising execution expenditures contribute to trade dress-a
separate and distinct asset by most non-tax law definitions of
property.289 Trade dress is the packaging of a product or service,
the overall image, or total look and feel of a product or service. 290
Trade dress can be the d6cor and ambience of a restaurant, the
packaging designs of cigars, and the look of and feel of a website. 291
Trade dress is entitled to registration with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. 292 Trade dress enjoys all protection
accorded trademarks under the Lanham Act.293 Likewise, both
advertising campaign expenditures and advertising execution
expenditures produce long-term benefits; indeed, trade dress, a
289 The intangibles regulations define a separate and distinct intangible asset as:
a property interest of ascertainable and measurable value in money's worth
that is subject to protection under applicable [sltate, [flederal, or foreign
law and the possession and control of which is intrinsically capable of being
sold, transferred, or pledged (ignoring any restrictions imposed on
assignability) separate and apart from a trade or business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(i) (2014). Then however, the regulations state that an amount
paid to create a package design is not treated as an amount that creates a separate and
distinct intangible asset. Id. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v).
- See Trade Dress, INTVL TRADEMARK ASS'N (Nov. 2015), http://www.inta.orglTrademark
Basics/FactSheets/Pages/Trade-Dress.aspx ("Trade dress is the overall commercial image
(look and feel) of a product that indicates or identifies the source of the product and
distinguishes it from those of others.").
291 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 766-67 (1992) (finding a
restaurant's trade dress to be inherently distinctive); RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 73
(finding the packaging for cigarettes to constitute trade dress).
292 See Trade Dress, supra note 290 (delineating requirements to register trade dress with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office).
293 See id. ("[Tirade dress like a trademark, is protected under the Federal Trademark Act
(Lanham Act).").
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product of both marketing campaigns and executions thereof,
provides long-term benefits over the life of the brand.294 Thus,
neither a "separate asset" test nor a "benefits" test provides a
useful framework for tax distinctions involving advertising.
The regulatory rules on tax treatment of repairs and
improvements to tangible property present a better framework for
determining the appropriate tax treatment of advertising. We
believe advertising campaign expenditures to build brand equity
can be analogized to costs of improvements to tangible property,
which have long been considered capital expenditures. 295
A business's valuable assets can be broken down into two
categories-tangible property and intangible property. The cost to
initially acquire tangible or intangible property must be
capitalized. For example, the cost to construct or purchase a
business building must be capitalized. 296 Likewise, the fees paid to
obtain initial registration of a trademark or to purchase another's
trademark must be capitalized. 297 After acquisition, a business
spends money to maintain and enhance the value of both its
tangible and intangible assets. For example, a business regularly
spends money to maintain its building to keep it in an efficient
operating condition. A business also sometimes spends
substantial sums to materially improve its building (e.g., a major
renovation or refurbishing of the building). Similarly, a business
regularly spends money to advertise its trademark though various
materials and techniques. On occasion a business spends
substantial sums on marketing campaigns introducing new
marketing concepts, themes, imagery, slogans, and the like.
It has long been the rule that expenditures for repairs and
maintenance to tangible property (incidental repairs that neither
materially add to the value of the tangible property nor
appreciably prolong its original life, but keep it in an ordinarily
294 See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
295 I.R.C. § 263(a) (2012).
296 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d)(1) (requiring capitalization of amounts paid to acquire or
produce "a unit of real or personal property"). Capitalized acquisition costs include related
transactions costs such as appraisal fees, commissions, and accounting and legal fees. Id.
§ 1.263(a)-2(f).
297 Id. § 1.263(a)-4(l), Example 9.
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efficient operating condition) may be deducted currently.298 In
contrast, expenditures for improvements (that add to the value, or
substantially prolong the useful life, of tangible property or that
adapt property to a new or different use) must be capitalized. 299
As with the problem of distinguishing between deductible and
nondeductible advertising, distinguishing between deductible
repairs and nondeductible improvements can be difficult under
either a separate asset test or future benefits test. Neither repairs
nor improvements to tangible property necessarily result in a
separate and distinct tangible asset. Both, however, arguably
produce benefits for the tangible property extending beyond the
current year.
Due to the difficulties of applying a generic separate-and-
distinct asset or future benefits test to distinguish deductible
repairs from capital improvements, the Treasury Department
issued a new regulatory framework in 2013.300 Generally,
amounts paid for repairs and maintenance to tangible property are
deducible unless they result in an "improvement" to property.
301
Tangible property is deemed to be improved in three situations: (1)
betterments, (2) restorations, and (3) adaptations to new or
different uses. 30 2
First, expenditures for betterments to tangible property must
be capitalized. 30 3 "Betterments" are changes to the property that
are a material addition to the property or are "reasonably expected
to materially increase the productivity, efficiency, strength,
quality, or output of the unit of property."30 4 Second, expenditures
for restoration, like expenditures for betterments, must be
capitalized.305 A restoration occurs in a variety of situations but
typically involves a major renovation or refurbishing of a tangible
298 See infra notes 300-07.
See infra notes 300-07.
3oo Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-1, -2, -3 (2014); see also supra note 268.
3' See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 ("A taxpayer may deduct amounts paid for repairs and
maintenance to tangible property if the amounts paid are not otherwise required to be
capitalized.").
302 Id. § 1.263(a)-3(d).
303 Id. § 1.263(a)-3(j)(1).
304 Id. § (j)(1)(iii).
305 Id. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(1).
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asset.3 06 Finally, expenditures that adapt tangible property to a
new or different use ("if the adaption is not consistent with the
taxpayer's ordinary use ... at the time originally placed in service
by the taxpayer") must also be capitalized. 30 7
The new regulatory framework for distinguishing deductible
repairs from capital improvements does not look to whether any
new asset was created or whether benefits last beyond the current
year. Rather, it focuses on the nature of the activities giving rise
to the expenditures. This approach is presently used by the
government in determining whether research and development
expenditures can be expensed under section 174 of the Code.308
Under the regulations, in determining whether research and
development costs can be deducted, the nature of the product
being developed is irrelevant; instead, the focus is on the "nature
of the activity to which the expenditures relate."30 9  Such an
approach would be well suited in similarly distinguishing
deductible advertising from nondeductible advertising.
A marketing campaign's impact on a company's valuable
intangible assets is similar to the impact of capital improvements
to a company's tangible property. A marketing campaign does not
sell anything, but rather prescribes an intangible marketing
concept (usually long-term) characterized by an image, theme,
slogan, or message.310 It can be equated to betterments to tangible
property if the advertising campaign is expected to materially
increase the strength of a brand. Alternatively, an advertising
campaign can be equated to a restoration if the campaign is
expected to rejuvenate an existing trademark. To the extent a
campaign adapts an existing trademark to new products, new
times, or new media, it could be equated to an adaptation to a
306 Id.
307 Id. § 1.263(a)-30)(1).
308 Id. § 1.14-2(a)(1).
39 Id. Deductible research expenses are broadly defined as "expenditures incurred in
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and development
costs in the experimental or laboratory sense." Id. The regulations require that such
expenditures be incurred in "activities intended to discover information that would
eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a product." Id.
310 See Marketing Campaign, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marke
ting-campaign.asp (defining "marketing campaign" as "a coordinated series of steps through
different mediums" to "promote a product, service or business").
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different use. In any of these scenarios, the campaign
expenditures should be capitalized.
Moreover, a marketing campaign enhances the existing
trademark's reputation, translating into an increase in the
distinctiveness of the trademark in the mind of the consuming
public. As public awareness or perception of the trademark rises,
the level of protection under trademark law increases. If the
trademark attains famous status, the trademark owner can gain a
unique, property-like status in the famous trademark.31' That
means the trademark owner can assert action against many new
entrants using similar marks, even absent a likelihood of
consumer confusion between the famous mark and the new
entrant's mark. 31 2 Essentially, a marketing campaign can lift the
status of the trademark to a higher level of protection that is not
available to the majority of trademarks.
Later individual executions of a campaign, in contrast, focus
more on the sale of a product and typically involve routine changes
to advertising materials or techniques to maintain customer
interest in the original marketing concept. The taxpayer incurs
institutional or goodwill advertising costs to keep its name before
consumers. These advertising executions do not resemble
betterments, restorations, or adaptations to different use in the
regulations governing tangible property and thus should be
expensed.
Requiring the capitalization of advertising campaign
expenditures (specifically graphic design and package design
costs), which resemble improvement costs to tangible property,
would go toward reconciling the tax treatment of tangible and
intangible assets. This is something the government has
attempted to achieve in the past, at least with respect to tax
depreciation rules. 31 3 Capitalization of campaign expenditures
311 See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in
Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 89, 99-101 (20 1) (discussing trademark dilution law
and how famous trademarks with national fame obtain property-like protection).
312 See id. at 95 ("The owner of the 'famous' name ... can enjoy the right to exclude even
without proof of likelihood of confusion caused by use of the famous name by others on
noncompeting goods.").
:113 At one point in tax history, the rules for depreciating intangible intellectual property
assets differed dramatically from the corresponding set of rules for depreciating tangible
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would likewise go toward reconciling the tax treatment of brand
development with brand enforcement, both of which are necessary
under intellectual property law. Such a regime would require
capitalization of salaries paid to employees primarily engaged in
developing package designs. It would also continue to require the
capitalization of fees paid to a governmental agency to obtain or
renew a trademark, trade name, copyright, or other similar right
granted by that governmental agency.
Under current law, capitalized advertising expenditures would
be amortized over fifteen years. As noted earlier, fifteen years
seems to be accepted by the government as the appropriate
recovery period for intangibles.314 There is limited empirical data,
assets. Over time, Congress enacted a detailed set of arbitrary depreciation rules for all
tangible assets. These Code provisions provided arbitrary conventions and methods for
depreciating costs of tangible assets, and more importantly, they provided artificially low
recovery periods (e.g., three, five, and seven years) for many tangible assets that arguably
have longer useful lives. I.R.C. §§ 167-168 (2012). This disparate treatment between
intellectual property assets and tangible assets created distortions that were unfair to
taxpayers. See Walburn, supra note 140, at 454-56 (explaining that the inequity between
similarly situated taxpayers resulted in noncompliance and much litigation, which
unnecessarily burdened the administration of tax law). For example, taxpayers who
acquired businesses with mostly tangible assets fared better than taxpayers who acquired
businesses with mostly intangible assets. This problem worsened as more and more
valuable business assets took the form of intangible assets. See Tax Treatment of Intangible
Assets: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 102d Cong. 23 (1991) (Statement of
Hon. Guy Vander Jagt) ("Taxpayers now spending considerable efforts and costs to prepare
detailed appraisals solely for the sake of distinguishing between intangible assets that are
amortizable as compared with those that are nonamortaizable.... [Elven greater expenses
are incurred when the I.R.S. challenges the treatment of these assets on audit and through
litigation."); id. at 30 (Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy,
Dep't of Treasury) (describing the rise of intangible assets in the market and the consequent
necessity of a law that provides certainty on the taxation of such assets). Seeking to
mitigate these distortions, many saw the need to reconcile the treatment of acquired
intangible assets with the treatment of acquired tangible assets. See DAVID W. BRAZELL ET
AL., OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL TAx DEPRECIATION POLICY 4, 12
(1989), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/documents/ota64.pdf
(explaining that "the first income tax regulations denied depreciation allowances for
goodwill.. . and other intangibles"). In 1993, Congress responded with section 197, which
prescribes an arbitrary fifteen-year recovery period for many intangibles. See LaFrance,
supra note 139, at 320 ("Congress enacted Section 197 in order to simplify the rules for
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of controversies arising from the need to
determine which intangibles are depreciable. .. . The statute achieves these goals by
imposing the fifteen-year straight-line method on most acquired intangibles.").
314 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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however, suggesting that the life of a brand is much less, and
therefore, a shorter recovery may be justified. 31 5
B. IDENTIFYING AN APPROPRIATE TAX FRAMEWORK FOR BRAND
ENFORCEMENT EXPENDITURES
As described earlier in this Article, litigation costs in patent and
copyright infringement cases are deductible; however, attorney's
fees and other litigation costs paid in connection with trademark
infringement claims are generally capitalized. 316 Although it
would be appealing from a tax advantage to view copyright,
patent, and trademark infringement actions generically, such
treatment would "ignore[] the actual inherent differences and
purposes of the various rights and remedies involved."317 While
copyright and patent infringement claims are brought for the
purpose of protecting royalties previously derived as well as those
to be derived in the future, trademark infringement claims are
brought for the principal purpose of removing the infringing threat
to a trademark, securing the property right of the taxpayer in the
trademark, eliminating future infringement, and increasing the
value of the taxpayer's trademark. One court's view of trademark
infringement suits was as follows:
The purpose and effect of the [trademark litigation]
expenses... was to increase the value of taxpayer's
registered trademark and to make more secure
315 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW SOURCES OF GROWTH: KNOWLEDGE-
BASED CAPITAL 14 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sfi/innofknowledge-based-capital-synthesis.
pdf (noting the productive life of branding is 2.8 years). The appropriate amortization
period for capitalized advertising costs is beyond the scope of this Article.
316 See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. Tax symmetry dictates that the awards
and settlements in such suits be treated differently for tax purposes. Indeed, it is generally
held that awards and settlements in patent and copyright infringement suits are taxed as
ordinary income. See, e.g., Big Four Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 1055, 1060 (1963) (finding
that award in patent infringement litigation is taxable as ordinary income); Mathey v.
Comm'r, 177 F.2d 259, 263 (1st Cir. 1949) ("[A]n award of damages is ordinarily... taxable to
him as income in the ear received."). In contrast, awards and settlements in trademark
infringement suits are received tax free if the basis of the claims lies in the trademark. See,
e.g., Inco Electroenergy Corp. v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 359 (1987) (finding settlement
proceeds obtained in trademark litigation are taxable as capital gains).
317 I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 199925012, 1999 WL 42489, at *3 (June 25, 1999).
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taxpayer's property in it by forever eliminating the
possibility of having it impaired by the competitive use
of this confusingly similar mark. Thus, though the
complaint for infringement as originally drawn
included a plea for damages, taxpayer's expenses did
not finance legal activity which recovered for
petitioner lost income or preserved its right to retain
income earned. The financial gain which petitioner
realized from these legal proceedings, through the
enhancement of the value of its registered trademark,
is an increment of a sort which will endure for many
years to come .... Financing the removal of a threat to
a trademark posed by an infringing mark resembles
the cost of perfecting or preserving title to property, a
cost well established as a capital expenditure, much
more than it resembles a current business expense. 318
Tax law generally does not place weight on the form of
litigation. For example, as noted above an infringement claim for
one type of intellectual property (patent or copyright) is not
necessarily treated the same for tax purposes as an infringement
claim for a different kind (trademark). Tax law instead relies on
the substance of the litigation, and for that, the plaintiffs primary
motivation in a particular claim (recover profits versus enhance
value or defend property) is crucial.319 This harkens back to the
judicially-crafted "substance over form" doctrine in tax
jurisprudence-the substance of a transaction will prevail over its
form.
32 0
There is one exception, however, in which case law has
arguably elevated form over substance. In trademark litigation,
the trademark owner asserts both trademark infringement and
unfair competition claims. While it is generally settled that
318 Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1964) (citations omitted).
119 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (describing the "origin-of-claim" test,
developed originally to determine whether costs of litigation were business-related or
personal, and later adapted to determine if litigation costs are deductible).
320 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (finding that a corporation
created only to transfer corporate shares to the petitioner "immediately was put to death"
once that purpose was realized).
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litigation costs in connection with a trademark infringement claim
must be capitalized, at least one case permitted current expensing
of litigation costs in connection with an unfair competition claim
on the basis that an unfair competition claim has its origin in
recovery of profits. 321 In Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United States,
discussed earlier, it was reasoned that the primary purpose of a
trademark infringement claim is to "secure a judicial
determination that the plaintiff had property rights in the mark,"
but the primary purpose of an unfair competition count is to
"secure money damages for alleged unfair competition, passing off,
etc."3 22 This tax distinction is questionable.
Trademark infringement claims arise under section 32 of the
Lanham Act and are available for registered trademarks. 323
Unfair competition claims arise under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act and are available to both unregistered and registered
trademarks. 324  Although a plaintiff must have a federally
registered mark to bring a section 32 trademark infringement
claim, 325 the two claims are closely related. 326 The same standard
for determining whether a trademark is valid and entitled to
protection applies to both claims. 327  The same standard for
establishing infringement-likelihood of consumer confusion-
applies to both claims: "[Iun either a claim of trademark
infringement under § 32 or a claim of unfair competition under
§ 43, a prima facie case is made out by showing the use of one's
321 Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1967); see also supra
notes 220-36 and accompanying text.
322 Rust-Oleum, 280 F. Supp. at 801.
323 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
324 Id. § 1125(a).
325 Id. § 1114(1).
326 Claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition "are subject to the same
test." Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008); Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The 'ultimate' test for unfair
competition is exactly the same as for trademark infringement: whether the public is likely
to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks." (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
327 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) ("[i]t is common
ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general
principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most
part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under
§ 43(a).").
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trademark by another in a way that is likely to confuse consumers
as to the source of the product."328  Most courts analyze the
likelihood-of-consumer confusion test and apply the same
conclusion to both claims. 329 Typically, the court extends its
finding in one claim to the other claim without wasting time and
judicial resources in repeating its finding. With respect to
remedies, both claims offer similar relief, including injunction and
damages. 330 After all, as courts have long observed, "the law of
trademark infringement is but a part of the law of unfair
competition, and the same test is applied in determining each
claim."
33 1
In light of the similarities between the two claims, litigation
costs in trademark infringement suits should be treated the
same-capitalized. Such approach would not elevate form over
substance, but instead would recognize that the primary purpose
of the trademark plaintiff is to establish the plaintiffs trademark
and not to recover income, as in the case of patent and copyright
infringement suits. Such approach would also avoid arbitrary
apportionments of expenses between deductible and nondeductible
expenditures that would be required if trademark infringement
328 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986).
329 See Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Under the Lanham
Act .... we use the same test to decide whether there has been trademark infringement,
unfair competition, or false designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the
two marks."); see also Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus. Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472-73
(3d Cir. 1994) (explaining the similar tests used to establish common law and federal
trademark law and unfair competition claims.
330 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) ("When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office ... shall have been established in any civil
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled .... subject to the principles
of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action.... In assessing damages the court may enter judgment,
according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual
damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of
the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the
circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.").
31 Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916)).
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claims and unfair competition claims were treated differently for
tax purposes. 332
VII. CONCLUSION
Brand advertising and enforcement represent a significant
investment by most firms. Yet, surprisingly, little scholarship is
devoted to the ideal tax regime that should govern investments in
both brand building and brand enforcement. Current tax rules
governing branding evolved in the absence of an appropriate legal
framework. The result is a regime with incoherent tax distinctions
that lack theoretical justification, suggesting that legislative or
administrative changes are warranted. This Article concludes that
the current tax treatment of ordinary brand advertising
(expensing) serves legitimate goals--expensing stimulates
economic growth, furthers administrative efficiency, and creates
an even playing field between businesses that advertise their own
brands and businesses that choose instead to license from others
the right to use well-known trademarks. However, current tax
treatment of advertising campaigns (expensing) is fundamentally
flawed: campaign expenditures, which strengthen, restore, or
elevate the brand, should be analogized to costs of improvements
to tangible property, which have long been considered
nondeductible capital expenditures. This Article also concludes
that the current tax distinction between trademark infringement
claims and unfair competition claims is unjustified. If substance is
to prevail in tax jurisprudence, litigation costs incurred in unfair
competition claims should be capitalized to reflect that both claims
are brought primarily to establish a taxpayer's trademark and not
to recover income.
332 In Rust-Oleum, the court merely split the litigation costs fifty-fifty between those
attributable to the trademark infringement count (not deductible) and those attributable to
the unfair competition count (deductible). 280 F. Supp. 796, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ("[T]he
proper determination of the instant controversy is to divide the expenses... including those
incident to the surveys, equally between those properly deductible and those not so
deductible.").
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